
Qass. 
Book. 



/^ 



A DEFENCE 



OP THE 



Mckinley administration 



FROM 



ATTACKS OF Mr. CARL BCHUliZ 



AND OTHER ANTI-IMPERIALISTS. 



BY 

JOHN R. DOS PASSOS, 

OF THE NEW YORK BAR. 



<:: 



^Y 






c1l3 



ILj I h~i -tri _A^ -fcri Jl 



1> 



U. S. Departra%f#6t Agriculture. 



aims 



By tranefei 

^La It 'Its 



The A:NTi-liN[PERiALisTS Answered. 



I. 

The Anti- Imperialists appeal to the conscience of the in<iictinent of 
nation upon a (Question of morality. iiniH-Aan'sts. 

They indic^t the President of the Hinted States and his 
Administration, through Mr, Carl tSchurz, of the chai'ge of 
turning the " much-vaunted war of liberation into a war 
of conquest and criminal aggression." 

They charge that " the President provoked an armed 
conflict with the B^ilipiuos," and that 

" we used the Filipinos as allies, and we profited from their 
co-operation as allies, and, in point of fact, recognized and 
treated them as allies so long as they could be useful to us, and 
that, therefore, we owed them those moral obligations which 
are always recognized between honorable allies." 

And, lastly, it is declared 

" thxit if vae had treated the Filiinnos justly loe should have 
recognized their independence. " (Carl Schurz, in the N. Y. 
Herald, July 14, 1900.) 

And Mr. Schurz, with great emphasis, addresses a chal- 
lenge (N. Y. Times, July 25, 1900), which he solemnly 
repeats and reiterates to the people of this country, to the 
" Imperialists " and to the Republican party, to 

" show me (him) in the history of the world a single act of 
per/idi/ committed by any Republic more infamous than that 
which has been committed by the McKinley administration 
against our Filipino allies." {Ibid. ) 

I have admired Mr. Schurz as a scholar; and I have 
looked upon him as an honest and independent critic of 
public events. His reiteration of these charges has been 
so sensational and dramatic, in fact, so vociferous ; his 



2 THE A X Tl-r M P E RIA I.r STS AXSWERED. 

characterization of persons has been so bitter, malignant 
and vindictive, his wholesale indictment of the people of 
this nation is so serious — that, together with his claim 
that he had received no answer to his broadly flaunted 
challenges, T have been induced to investigate the charges 
on my own account ; to go to the foundation of this melan- 
choly alTair ; to follow all of its details from beginning to 
end, and to examine the questions, as they arose, in the light 
of morality, as well as of the principles of international 
and constitutional law. The result of my labors I now 
give to the public. I rejoice and am proud that this in- 
vestigation shows that the charges preferred are unfounded, 
base and unnatural, in fact and in law; that they have 
been made either from gross ignorance of the facts, or a 
misapprehension of them, or from a deliberate disregard of 
truth, and a malignant and unchristianlike hatred of our 
civil officers, soldiers and sailors — from the President down 
to the lowliest private. 

I have endeavored to arrange the events in chronological 
order, and referred to each authority upon which I have 
relied to sustain this argument so that the correctness 
of my statements may be easily verified by reference 
to the documents cited. By this means, all of the 
sources of my knowledge are disclosed, and by easy ref- 
erence the argument which I propose to submit can be 
followed step by step to its conclusion. If the inferences 
drawn from the facts are unwarranted, if the reasons I 
urge for my views are unjustifiable, if the result I reach is 
a non sequitur, each and all of these things will at once be 
perceived and exposed. I have no x)ersonal hatred or poli- 
tical revenge to satisfy, no political favors to demand or re- 
ceive ; am subject to no partisan dictation, and responsible 
alone for these views. I have searched for the truth — the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth — and here it is : 

The facts relevant to this discussion are to be found in 
the history of this country between the 15th day of Feb- 



THE ANTI-l.yrERJAl.lSTS A.wsn'ENi-.n. 3 

ruary, 1898, wlieii our battle-sliii) Maine was blown w\\ 
in the harbor of Havana, and the 4th ilay of February, 
1899, when hostilities began in the Philippine Islands, 
between the Filii)inos, under Aguinaldo, and our army. 

Prior to 1890 there had been several insurrections in the Mistor> ..r 

FirKt IiiKiirrL'c- 

Philippine Islands against the Spanish Government; but j.,'!;;',','",,^ 
as their history is not germane to the present controversy, "*^'''|n",V|jf''*''' 
it is not necessary to investigate it. The rebellion of 189(5, 
however, is a highly important factor in this discussion, 
because it shows the exact relations which the people of 
the Philippine Islands bore to tlie sovereignty of Spain ; it 
reveals the political status of the inhabitants of these 
islands at that time. The insurrection of 1896 was pre- 
ceded, or accompanied, by a pronuncianiento or procla- 
mation, showing its cause, scope and purpose. It was an 
uprising of the people to obtain the redress of certain 
Si)ecific grievances which were set forth as follows : 

" 1. Expulsion of the friars and restitution to the town- 
ships of the lands which the friars have appropriated, — divid- 
ing the incumbencies held by them, as well as the Episcopal 
sees, equally between peninsular and insular secular priests. 

2. Spain must concede to xis, as she has to Cuba, parliamen- 
tary representation, freedom of the press, toleration of all 
religious sects, laws common -with hers, and administrative and 
economic autonomy. 

3. Equality in treatment and pay between peninsular and 
insular civil servants. 

4. Restitution of all lands, appropriated by the friars, to the 
townships, or to the original owners, or, in default of tiiuling 
such owners the State, is to put them up to public auction in 
small lots of a value within the reach of all, and payable 
within four years, the same as the present State laiuls. 

5. Abolition of the Government authorities' power to banish 
citizens, as well as unjust measures against Filipinos, legal equal- 
ity for all persons, whether peninsular or insular, under the 
civil as well as the penal code. The war must be prolonged 
to give the greatest signs of vitality possible, so that Spain 



4 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

may be compelled to grant our demands, otherwise she will 
consider us an effete race and curtail, rather than extend our 
rights." (Vol. I. Rep. Philippine Com., p. 84.) 

seltTemenfof '^^^^^ ^^ ^^^i^' bill of piglits ; tlils paper shows US the 
"''of 181)"'°'' purposes for which the people uprose against Spain. 

The rebellion lasted until the 14th of December, 1897, 
when, at a place called Biacna-Bato, a written treaty was 
entered into between the insurgents and the Spanish Gov- 
ernment; Aguinaldo representing the former, and Gover- 
nor-General Prinio de Rivera, by proxy, the latter. The 
terms of this treaty and the methods of carrying it out 
are so extraordinary and unusual that they cannot fail 
to awaken in the mind of an Anglo-Saxon mingled 
feelings of astonishment, indignation and pity. It was 
stipulated that Aguinaldo and his leading associates 
should leave the islands — that they should voluntarily 
expatriate themselves — and take up a residence outside of 
their native land, in consideration of the payment of a cer- 
tain sum of money, l. e., $800,000, and the surrender of 
the arms of the insurgents to the Spanish Government 
(Senate Document 208, Part 2, 56th Congress, 1st Session, 
p. 9., Report of the Philippine Commission, Vol. I., p. 
170. The Story Told by Aguinaldo, p. 3). It is a strik- 
ing feature of this remarkable treaty that it did not even 
provide for a redress of the grievances of the people ! 
(See the treaty, Senate Document 208, Part II., 56th Con- 
gress, 1st Session, p. 9.) In fact they are not mentioned 
in it. 

" The ])rincipal reforms which were said to have been 
agreed upon by word of mouth, were the suppression of re- 
ligious orders, and the taking away from those religious orders 
of all intervention in the administration of towns." (Vol. II. 
Report of Philippine Com., p. 379.) 

But this is denied by General de Rivera, who stated in 
the Spanish Cortes, according to Agoncillo, Aguinaldo's 
agent, that he 

"had promised no reforms to Sefior Aguinaldo and his army 



rUE A XTI- IMl'ERIA I. IS TS A NS IV EN ED. 5 

but that he had only yiven them a piece of L read In order that 
they iiilyht be able to maintain theinaelms abroad."" (55th 
Congress, Senate Document G2, Part I., p. -IIJO. ) 

It is no wonder, under these circinn.st:nH;es, tluit A^nii- A^'ninai.io, 
uuldu should be openly accused ol' sellln- out his country 'cimrS'"".'' 
for gold. Nor do I ilud anywhere in his story that Agui- 
naldo liatlyaiid squarely denies this charge — in fact, as we 
shall see, he admits the receii)t of the money. 1 have my 
own opinion about the matter; but I prefer to give the 
facts and allow everyone to draw his own conclusions and 
to form his own judgment upon them. The importance 
of introducing this element— of Aguinaldo's honesty or 
dishonesty— into this branch of the discussion is, that it 
bears upon his personal character ; it enables one to judge, 
when he makes a statement which is opposed to or con- 
tradicted by the statements of our own officers, whether he 
is entitled to more credit than those officers. Aguinaldo // 
is an important element in this Philippine question— 7^e is, I 
in fad, the wlwleof it — and it is of supreme importance '' 
that we should have as clear and full a view of his charac- 
ter as a man as it is possible for us to obtain. 

He has succeeded in awakening the profound sym- 
pathies of Mr. Schurz and his fellows of the Anti-impe- 
rialistic League, and of the Democratic party. He is the 
chief, prominent, central figure on the Philippine side, 
and it is his testimony which is invoked to sustain all of 
the promises alleged to have been made to him by our 
officials for the future independence of the Filipinos. 
Therefore, every oflficial and public act of his life becomes 
of importance, not only for the present but for future 
purposes. It is quite essential that in the outset we should 
have some knowledge of this man, of his honesty, his pat- 
riotism, his ability, his knowledge, and all the other qual- 
ities necessary to. be possessed by one who ambitiously 
aspires upon his own ipse dixit to govern a nation of eio-ht 
millions or more people. It is admitted that, upon the ter- 



b THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

minatiou of the rebelliou of 1896, the insiirgeuts surrend- 
ered their arms to the Spaniards, that Aguinaldo and his 
nearest associates voluntarily expatriated themselves, choos- 
ing Hongkong as their place of residence, and that the sum 
of 8400,000 was paid to Aguinaldo iu part performance of 
the terms of the treaty. The balance of the money, it is 
said, was not paid, because the Spanish General, de 
Rivera, stated he would not do so until the complete 
pacification of the Philippines. (Senate Document 208, 
Part II., 56th Congress, 1st Session, p. 3.) For what 
purpose was money paid to Aguinaldo? Was it a bribe? 
Was it money paid to him to be afterwards divided 
between himself and a few of his officers? Let the facts 
speak. There are several versions of this transaction 
brought out in consequence of open charges of corruption 
against Aguinaldo by his countrymen and others — I give 
them all. Aguinaldo himself relates his version. He 
says • 

" The whole of the money was to be paid to me person- 
ally, leaving the disposal of the money to my discretion and 
knowledge of the understanding with my associates and other 
insurgents." (The Story Told by Aguinaldo, p. 3.) 

Then there is another version, which comes through 
Wildman, our Consul-General at Hongkong, who, him- 
self, had several pecuniary transactions with Aguinaldo, 
according to the latter's story (The Story Told by Aguinaldo, 
p. 9), and who, under date of July 19th, 1898, writes 
(The Anti- Imperialist, Vol. I., No. 2, p. 48): 

"Consulate United States, Hongkong, July 18, 1898 * * * 
It has been said that they sold their country for gold, but this 
has been conclusively disproved, not only by their own state- 
ments, but by the speech of the late Governor-Genei'al Primo 
de Rivera, in the Spanish Senate, June 11, 1898, who said 
that Aguinaldo undertook to submit if the Spanish Govern- 
ment would give a certain sum to the loidoios and orphans of 
the insurgents. He then admits that only a tenth part of this 



THE A A'T/./AfP F.R rA /./STS Ah'^WEKED. 7 

sum was ever i^iven to AguinaMo, and tliat tlio ntlicr promises 
made he did not lind it expedient to keep." 

But it is an impressive fact, in this connection, that the 
money was deposited in Aguinaldo's own name in the 
Hongkong bank, and not in trust for tlie widows and 
orphans of the insurgents, and tliat not a dollar of it was 
ever used for the noble and high-sounding charity alluded 
to by General Rivera in the Spanish Senate. Here we 
have General Rivera giving his version of the transaction, 
stating that the money was paid for the widows and 
orphans of the insurgents, and Aguinaldo giving another, 
to the effect that it was paid to hitn to be used in his dis- 
cretion. But there is still another version of the affair, 
which irresistibly appeals to our experience and judgment 
as men — which contains an ad hominem argument — and 
which came out in a legal action in Hongkong, instituted 
by one Ysabelo Artacho. He brought suit against Aguinaldo 
to recover $200,000, his share of the money, claiming that 
Aguinaldo refused to pay him. Aguinaldo's version of 
this whole transaction is this : 

" * * * I was interrupted by letters from Ysabelo Artacho 
and his sohcitors, on the 5th of April, 1898, claiming $200,000 
of the money received from the Sjjanish authorities. * * * 
These letters contain the threat that failure to comply with 
the demand of Artacho would result in him bringing me before 
the courts of law in Hongkong. It may make the matter 
clearer, if I mention at this point, that Ysabelo Artacho ar- 
rived at Biac-na-Bato and made himself known to and mixed 
with the officers in the revolutionary camp on the 2 1st day of 
September, 1897, and was appointed Secretary of the Interior 
in the early part of November of that year, when the treaty of 
peace, proposed and negotiated by Don Pedro Alzandro, a 
I'epresentative of General Rivera, was almost concluded, as is 
proved bj' the fact that the document was signed on the 14th 
of December of that year. In the light of these facts, the un- 
just and unreasonable nature of the claim of Artacho is easily 
discernible, for it is monstrous to claim §200,000 for services 



THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 



Aguinaldo re- 
ceives money 
from Siianish 
Government 
to end tlie 
Reliellion. 



rendered to tbe revolutionary government during such a brief 
period. Moreover, it is a fact that it was aijrecd between our- 
selves that in the event of the Spaniards failing to comply with 
each and every one of the promises and conditions of the 
agreement, the money obtained from the Si)anish Government 
should not he divided, but must be employed in the purchase 
of arms and ammunition to renew the war of independence. 
It is therefore evident that Artacho, in making this prepos- 
terous demand, was acting as a spy for the enemy, as an agent 
of General Primo de Rivera, for he wanted to extinguish the 
rebellion by dei)riving its leaders of the most indispensable ele- 
ment, the * sinews of war,' which is money. This was the view, 
too, of the whole of my colleagues, and it was resolved that 
/ shoidd leave Hongkong immediately and thereby avoid the 
litigation which Artacho seemed bent upon, and thereby afford 
my companions time and opportunity to remove this new and 
ii'Jiolly unexpected barrier to the realization of our cherished 
plans for the emancipation of our beloved fatherland. I am 
profoundly pleased to say that they succeeded, ArtacJio with- 
drawing the suit THROUGH A TRANSACTION." (The Story Told 
by Aguinaldo, pp. 4-5.) 

It thus appears, according to Aguinaldo's own state- 
ment, that he did not meet this question in Court, but that 
he Hed from Hongkong to avoid that end, allowing his 
associates to compromise with Artacho, which they did, 
by paying him a sura of money, and thus procured the 
withdrawal of the suit. If the money paid by the Span- 
ish Government were paid for the benefit of the widows 
and orphans of the insurgents, it is curious that Artacho 
would bring suit to recover his share of it; but it is mani- 
fest from the statement of Aguinaldo that the money toas 
paid to be distributed between himself and Ms asso- 
ciates, because he expressly admits, in the preceding 
statement, that the money could be so divided among 
these co-patriots, but that they subsequently agreed to 
hold it in the bank until they ascertained whether Spain 
would comply with the conditions and promises of the 



THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 9 

agTeement. Perliaps it would prove a good investment to 
open up another insurrection. Aguinaldo, therefore, stands 
convicted, upon liis own statement, of having received 
money from tlie Spanish Government to stop the rebellion. 
Does such an act constitute a justification for the assertion 
that he sold his country for gold? Do the facts surround- 
ing this tr;nisa('ti(Mi show biihery or corruption? These 
are questions which each individual can answer according 
to his convictions. What eventually became of this $400,- 
000, apart from the payment made to compromise Artacho's 
claim, does not appear from the records which I have had 
before me, but it must be said, in justice to Aguinaldo, 
that our Consul at Manilla, Mr. Oscar F. Williams, in a 
letter to the Secretary of State, said : 

"To-day I executed a power of attorney whereby General 
Aguinaldo releases to his attorneys in fact $400,000, now in 
bank at Hongkong, so that money therefrom can pay for 3,000 
stands of arms brought there and expected here to-morrow." 
(Senate Doc. No. 62, Part 1, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 338.) 

From which it appears that some portion of the money 
may have been spent for the purchase of these arms. It 
constitutes no answer to the accusation to say that some 
of this money was again reinvested in arms. The orig- 
inal motive and purpose of the payment of the money to 
Aguinaldo and his associates, loas to end the insurrection 
and get rid of the leaders. This loas accomplished, and 
the Spanish Government did not pay the cash until Agui- 
aldo was landed high and dry in Hongkong ! And these 
patriots thought so little of their country that the reforms 
promised were not even put in the treaty ! This same 
Aguinaldo is the individual into whose hands the merciful 
and philanthropic Anti-Imperialists would entrust the 
government of the Philippine Islands ! This is the man 
in reference to whom so many pathetic and tearful appeals 
have been made ! 

Aguinaldo is thus introduced to us through the rebel- 



10 THE AXTI-IMPF.RIALfSTS ANSWERED. 

lion of 1896. When the war broke out between the 
United States and Sj)ain, we find him living in Hongkong, 
a voluntary exile from his country, the possessor of this 
large sum of money, which he says himself was to be 
divided among himself and his associates. Upon the facts 
to which I have alluded, I think he appears upon the 
scene already discredited as a man and as a witness. I 
have tried in vain to reconcile his acceptance of this money 
and his voluntary exile from his native land with any sense 
or motive of patriotism, honor or justice. The Anti-Impe- 
rialists have taken him to their bosoms — they have held him 
up as an honored citizen and pure patriot — as a species of 
Washington. I think they should be disillusioned when 
they reflect upon this evidence. I think that we must 
accept Aguinaldo as he appears in the light of this remark- 
able Biac-na-Bato transaction, and when his statments are 
opposed to statements of our officers of our army and 
navy, we should hesitate to adopt his version, unless it 
is strongly corroborated by other and independent facts ; 
and the inquiry arises w^hether the criticism of Colonel 
Kennon, of the 34tli Infantry, who appears to have made 
a careful analysis of the facts, is not correct : 

" I would not venture to say that this uprising was not 
fully justified. It proved a faihire, and its leaders^ Aguinaldo 
in particular, loere bou(/?it ojf\ and, for a swn of money, 
agreed to leave the country. * * * /j; i^ to he noted that 
at tlie time in question they loere not struggling patriots, but 
hought-off traitors, shrexodly trying to turn the existing condi- 
tions to their oxon personal advantage.'' (Letter of Colonel 
Kennon to Senator Proctor, Congressional Record, 1st Sess. , 
56tb Congress, p. 2772.) 

The same criticism was made by our Consul at Manila, 
on March 31, 1898, who, in a letter to our Secretary of 
State, said : 

" Months ago pacification was claimed by the Governor- 
General It was false. A truce had been bought witli -li^ 1,050- 
000 (the ecjuivalent in silver of ^800,600 gold), during which 



THE ANJ'l-IMrEKIAI.lsrS AM. WE RED. 



11 



the Govenior-Geiieral hopi-d to cinltark for Spiiiii, l.utall was a 
hollow farce." (Senate Docuinent No. G2, 55th Cong., 3rd 
Sess., Parti., p. 322.) 
In a previous letter dated Febiuaiy 22(1, 1898 (^Ibld., 
p. 320), he had said : 

" Certain rebel leaders loere given a cash bribe of $1,650^000 
to consent to public deportation to Chbia. Tliis bribe and 
deportation only midtijylied claimants and fanned the fires of 
discontent."" 
I do not wish to do this man any injustice. Perhaps 
his receipt of the money was consistent with patriotism 
and honesty. Suppose we assume that it was so. The 
assumption will not diminish a tittle the strength of the 
argument which I shall hereafter make. Proceeding upon 
this last view, leaving all the history appertaining to the 
receipt of the $400,000 out of the question, I come now to 
the enquiry as to the substance oi the insurrection of 1896. 
What was the insurrection of 1896? What was its scope, jj^he^fjjf^.i^^ 
width, breadth, length and purpose? It was simply an I'^^is^'"' 
uprising of the people to redress certain grievances loiULin thfsX'rSty 
the Spanish Government. It was in no sense an uprising ''^^p^'"- 
for independence or for the establishment of a separate 
sovereignty ; it had no such end in view, as shown by the 
proclamation and verified by the treaty. There is a differ- 
ence between a war of revolution, which generally aims to 
\ overthrow an existing government, and an insurrection, 
' which acknowledges sovereignty but strives to redress 
certain grievances. The English barons were willing that 
John should be King, but they stood sword in hand insist- 
ing that there should be granted to them certain great 
rights of liberty and property. 

"A war of revolution is generally undertaken for the dis- 
merabenBent of a state and the separation of one of its parts 
or for the overthrow and radical change of the government ; 
while an insurrectionary war is sometimes waged for a very 
different purpose." (Sir Sherston Baker's " First Steps in 
International Law," p. 179.) 



12 THE AXTI IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

Read this piece of testimony in tliis connection : 

"Q. Did they have at any time during the course of that 
revohition the idea of fighting for their independence ? 

A. No; I never heard this word 'independence' spoken, 
nor do I think they are capable of understanding it, even up 
to this time." (Testimony before Philippine Com., Vol. II., 
Report, p. 381.) 

The purpose of this insurrection of 1896 was to fight 
for certain reforms within the government, and when the 
uprising was ended, the complete and absolute sovereignty 
of Spain over these islands was unquestioned and un- 
questionable; and, with the exception of an unimportant 
outbreak in Cebu, the rebellion had been confined to 
Luzon. Spain's sovereignty in the other islands had never 
been questioned, and the thought of independence never 
entertained by the residents thereof. (Report of the Phil- 
ippine Commission, Vol. I., p. 171.) So much for this 
epoch in the history of the Philippine Islands. It shows 
the status of those people down to the beginning of 1898. 



II. 

Events in We come, then, to the period intervening between Feb- 

Pliilippines be- ^ ^ -» r 

t"*^«° Febru- riiary, 1898, wiien the Maine was blown up, and the an- 

aiy, 1H98, and ./ ^ / x ' i 

May 19, 1808. pearauce of Aguinaldo on the warship of Admiral Dewey, 
in the harbor of Manila, May 19th, 1898. 

It was apparent to everyone, after the destruction of 
the Maine, that an armed conflict between the United 
States and Spain was inevitable, and, in fact, open prepar- 
ations were made in this country for the forthcoming 
war. This was heralded all over the world, and long 
before the actual declaration of war had been made 
our Ambassadors, Consuls, and our Navy in the East 
were prepared for the blow. This was especially the 
fact at Hongkong, where, during February and March, 
measures were laid for the approaching war, and where 



Till: ANTl.IMl'ENIAI.ISTS ANSWERED. V^ 

the ruiriors and prospects ol" hostilitit-s ucic opmly and 
actively discussed. The Spaniards, it seems, after getting 
rid of Aguinahlo and possessing tliemselves of tlie arms « i 
used by tlie insurgents, failed to grant the promised re- 
forms to the Filipinos, the principal of which, as related 
by Aguinaldo, were to restrict the friars in their acts of 
tyranny and oppression — to expel them — and to secularize 
religions orders. (Story Told by Agninaldo, p. 4.) lie- 
sides this the other instalments of the money stipulated 
had not been paid. 

" This failure " (says Agiiiiiaklo) " of the Spanish authori- 
ties to abide by the terms of the treaty, caused me and my 
companions much unhappiness, which quickly changed to ex- 
asperation when I received a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel 
Don Miguel Primo de Rivera (nephew and jtrivate secretary 
of the above-named General), informing me that I and my 
companions could never return to Manila." (Story Told by 
Aguinaldo, p. 4.) 

The Filipinos themselves were angry because a matter 
of business had been made of an insurrection, and they 
had no confidence in the Spaniards. 

" As a matter of fact these promises were never carried out. 
The civil guard began to whip and to shoot and abuse the peo- 
ple as before, and it is stated that in the Province of Manila 
more than two lumdred men were executed. As a direct re- 
sult of these further abuses sporadic uj^risings occurred in sev- 
eral provinces of Luzon, but they had nothing of the coherence 
or strength of the original movement, being attempts to 
avenge particular wrongs rather than efforts to secure general 
reform. The straggling and numerically insignificant insur- 
gent forces lacked arms, ammunition, and leaders. Spain dis- 
banded her volunteer Filipino militia and prepared to send her 
regular troops home." (Report of Philippine Commission, 
Vol. L, p. 171.) 

And thus was commenced what I shall call the second BeKinmng of 

Second Insur- 

insurrection. It must be borne in mind that the treaty of recuon in i898. 
Biac-na-Bato was not executed until December 14tli, 1897, 



14 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

and that the probability of war between the United States 
and Spain was in everybody's mouth in February, 1898. 
The condition, assuming that the Filipinos wished to 
uprise against the Spanish Government, was this : 
Aguinaldo had given up all their arms, and their leaders 
were out of the country, and they were confronted, as a 
matter of fact, with two dilemmas, either of which was 
fatal to the insurrection : If a war between the United 
States and Spain had not been imminent no second rebel 
lion would have broken out, or if, on the other hand, 
in the absence of any prospect of war, a rebellion had 
been inaugurated, it would have been speedily put down 
by Spain, because she would have had no other work 
on her hands. War being imminent, our Consuls and 
officers in the East immediately busied themselves with 
plans and suggestions to aid their country, and ourConsul- 
General at Singapore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, having dis- 
covered that Aguinaldo was in that place (where he had 
gone, be it remembered, to hide from the process of 
Artaclw), sought to avail himself of Aguinaldo's services, 
just as he would those of any other individual who had 
been so closely connected with the Spaniards in the Philip- 
pines, and who knew the character, manner, habits, and 
resources of the natives ; and it may even be conceded that 
^trASufnaw<f Pi'^tt sought out Agulnaldo and opened a conference with 
GenSat hii^- But it is clear and uneq[uivocal that Pratt made no 
promises to Aguinaldo; his purpose was to get Aguinaldo 
to go to Dewey, and he telegraphed to the Department of 
State, under date of July 28th, 1898, that he 

" iJeclined to discuss with General Aguinaldo the question 
of the future policy of tJie United States with regard to the 
Pliilipirines., that I held out no hopes to hint of any kind, 
committed the Government in no vmy v^hatever^ and, in the 
course of our conferences, never acted upon the assumption 
that the Government vwvld act with Aguinaldo for the fur- 
therance of any plan of his oion, 7} or that inacc€p>ting his said 



Sinj^apore. 



Aguioalilo. 



THE AyTI-IM/'ER/A/./STS A XSIVF.NF.D. 13 

co-operation it irotdd consider itself pledged to recoynize any 
political claim lohic/i he nii(jlit put fonnard." (('oiigressional 
Record, ootli Congress, 3r(l Sess. , p. 2512.) 

Does Agiiiuuldo deny this? If he dues we have our 
Consul on one side and Agninaklo on the other. We 
liave also the same exact, terse and clear statements 
fronj all of our other officials. Besides, we have the 
explicit instructions from the State Department, which 
confirm everything our officers say. As the result of 
the several interviews in Singapore, Aguinaldo was in- 
vited by Dewey to come to Hongkong; but before he 
reached there Dewey had left, and it was only on May interview im?- 
lOtli, 1898, eighteen clays after the Spanish Jleet had been *'7)ew./y'mi'<j™' 
destroyed, and when it was manifest to the whole world 
that the Fhilippine Islands were to fall into the posses- 
sion of the United States soldiers that an interview be- 
tween Aguinaldo and Dewey took place. 

Dewey made no promises to Aguinaldo; he had it in his 
power to do so, but he was on his guard against him. A 
few days after the first interview he received a cable from 
Washington, from the Secretary of the Navy (Long), as 
follows : 

Washington, May 26, 1898. 
"Dewey: You must exercise discretion most fully in all 
mattei's and be governed according to circumstances which 3^011 
know and which we cannot know. You have our confidence 
entirely. It is desirable as far as possible and consistent loith 
your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the 
insurgents or any faction in the islands that woidd incur lia- 
bility to maintain their cause in the future. " 

Dewey replied on. June 3d : 

" Secretary of the Navy, Washington: 

Receipt of telegram of May 26 is acknowledged and I tliank 
the Department for the expression of confidence. Have acted 
according to the spirit of the Department's instructions therein 
from the beginning, and I have entered into no alliance tcith 



16 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

the insurgents or %oith any faction. This squadron can reduce 
the defences of Manila at any moment, but it is considered 
useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to re- 
tain possession." (Cong. Rec, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 2511.) 

With that despatch from the Secretary of the Navy in 
his hand, it is wholly impossible, in fact oat of the ques- 
tion, that Admiral Dewey would have subsequently made 
any promise to Aguinaldo. He was specially warned by 
the Department not to enter into any arrangement by 
which this Government would be identified with any in- 
surrection party. The evidence upon this point is so 
overwhelming that even Mr. Schurz does not dispute it, 
for he admits : 

' ' I never said that formal alliances or agreements or prom- 
ises were made," [New York Herald., July 14, 1900,] 

No promises At this time we knew little or nothing about the Philip- 
made to O 1. 

Aguinaldo. j^ine Islands — we were groping in the dark — we were 
studying the questions — we were feeling our way — filling 
ourselves with all details, so that when the time came we 
might be able to act with a ripe and mature judgment; so 
that we might be just and fair to all the people of those 
islands, and to all the interests involved. We did not 
know whether there were one or twenty-five insurrections 
/ in the Philippine Islands, and a more clear-headed, 
humane, conscientious, conservative, sagacious policy, than 
that conducted through the office of the Secretary of State 
it is impossible to conceive of, so far as I can judge from 
the facts and records which have come under my observa- 
tion — and I think I have seen everything relevant to the 
subject. 

Let us go back to the meeting between Dewey and 
Aguinaldo on the 19th of May, on the deck of the 
Olympia. Notwithstanding Mr. Schurz admits no prom- 
ises were made, I purpose to investigate each feature and 
element of this history. Much is sought to be made 
of this conference, and it should be closely analyzed. 



THE ANTI-IMPERrA/JSTS ANSWERED. 17 

A question tirst arises us to the ollicial diameter of AK'uiuai.i..s 

ofllcial clmr- 

Aguinaldo. Wlio was he? What was he at this time? acfc.r mmiy/..'d. 
He was an exile, a mere private individual, with no public 
or official character or i)osition of any kind whatever; he 
had voluularily exi)atriated himself from his own country, 
and was prohibited by Spain from visiting there. He was 
not connected with any insurrection, exce})t in so far as 
it might have his moral and pecuniary support — in fact, 
there is no evidence that any insurrection had begun. 
If anything, he was engaged in the business of launching 
a rebellion. He did not officially represent the Filipinos, 
not only because he had not and could not land on their 
shores without the aid of the United States, but for the 
more powerful reason that they had no govt^rnment what- 
ever. The insurgents had not, at this time, put them- 
selves in the field, except in a most scattered, insignificant 
vray ; they had no arms and did not receive any until they 
were delivered through the instrumentality of the United 
States boats and troops ; the insurrection was not organ- 
ized ; the people had made no declaration of independ 
ence or sovereignty, they had adopted no constitution — 
no flag — no form of government; they had neither legal 
nor local habitation nor name, nor any of the insignia of 
government ; at most thej' were simply straggling mal- 
contents, without officers, arms or ammunition, wait- 
ing to be born, fed, clothed, organized and strength- 
ened into an insurrection by the influences of the navy 
and army and power of the United States Cxovernment ; 
and ready to take advantage of any opportunity which 
might advance their interests. The argument that a series 
of talks at this time, no matter how deep and serious, 
between Aguinaldo and our Naval officers or Consuls, under 
such circumstances, can be made the basis of an international 
compact binding upon the people of the United States can- 
not be considered — it is absurd — nor would any alleged 
promises under the circumstances, even if coupled with 



1» THE AXTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

actual and beneficial war services rendered in pursuance 
of them, make an}' stronger case, as I shall endeavor to 
show ; for, amono- others, this reason : Aguinaldo was 
nothing — he represented nothing, and could represent 
nothing, because there was nothing to represent. What 
was the name of his government? What was its char- 
acter? Where was it located? Was it a monarchy, an 
aristocracy or a democracy? Where was the seat of 
government? What was its official roster? I am now 
speaking of affairs and events previous to June 23d, 1S98; 
I am following closely and attentively each event during 
this period, because it seems to me that we should keep 
constantly in view and have a clear understanding of the 
status of Aguinaldo and his followers at each epoch of 
this history. 

On the 19th of May, and dow» to the 23d of June, when 
Aguinaldo dictatorially adopted a constitution, there could 
be no pretext w^hatever that any insurrection existed in 
the Philippine Islands with which Aguinaldo was asso- 
ciated in any official capacity. It is true that, like lago, 
he had designs — plans — in his mind, but he had been 
plainly told by our Consuls and other officers and by 
Dewey, that he could expect no official recognition from 
them or from this Government. Is there any question as 
to who we are to believe if there is a contest of veracity? 
It is undoubtedly true that Aguinaldo had deep designs, 
but they were concealed from our officers. According to 
the testimony of Colonel Kennon (Cong. Rec. 56th Cong., 
1st Sess., p. 2772), it appears that 

" On the 4tli of May, 1898, Aguinaldo, Agoncillo and a few 
others held a meeting in this city (Hongkong), in v)hich tlie 
present war xoas planned, in case the government of the isUmds 
loas not turned over to them hy the Americans. [Pure, guileless 
Aguinaldo!] It is to be noted that at the time in question 
they were not struggling patriots, but boiight-off traitors, 
shrewdly trying to turn the existing conditio'ns to their own 



Till: A X TI-IM I'ERIA I. IS I'S A XS WENKn. 



10 



personal (idiHiutaye, I'/ielr jdau iran to u/iiln toith the Ainerl- 
ca/is, procure arms from them, n'hlrh later mere to he used 
nyainst their liberators. I have myst'lf read the minutes of 
this meeting, signed by Agoneillo, \\\ wliich this plan is pro- 
posed by Aguinaldo.'" 

The wisdom of tlie Government was never so apparent — 
its prudence in lioldin<5 Af^uinaldo :it aim's length never 
appeared more Justiliable — tlian it(h)es to-day, in tlie light 
ol' all of the recently disclosed and surrounding circHim 
stances — for it seems that this man had conceived from the 
very beginning a pur[)ose of establishing a dictatorial gov- 
ernment in the Philii)pine Islands, of his own manufac- 
ture, without any regard to the wishes of the inhabitants, 
and that he had conceived the design of carrying that out, 
even in opposition to the United States, with the very 
weapons and arms which he expected to receive from our 
Government. And yet we find the Anti-imperialistic 
League all in tears for this great, mild, lovely and patriotic 
Aguinaldo ! He, who did not propose to give us time to 
breathe, before, anticipating any intention of ours, he 
would attempt to snatch the Philippines from us ! 

In the month of May, and down to the 23d of June, 
therefore, the situation in the Philippines was that the 
United States was trying to defeat Spain, t/ie supreme and 
undoubted sovereign of these islands, and to capture them 
from her. This was as clear as the noonday sun, without 
a shadow of any intervening right or title between these two 
powers. It was clear that the Philippines were doomed 
to be lost to Spain — clear to Spain — clear to the world — 
clear to Aguinaldo. Out of this inevitable result — out of 
the circumstances attending the capture of Manila — came 
the crystallization of the forces under Aguinaldo. The 
revolution, if it can be called so (and I claim that that is a 
misnomer), was born, nourished and grew out of the 
power and influence of the United States Government. It 
was a mere branch springing from the principal tree of 



A»;iiiiiiil(lo'H 

s<'luMrif U> coii- 

siiiiv a^'iiiriKt 

tllO (icjVlTll- 
lIK'Ill of tin' 

I'tilUKl Statt-H 
oil May 4, WJH. 



Spain the 

Sovt-reign of 

the Islands 

in June, 1898. 



20 



THE ANTf-FMPERIAr.rSTS ANSWERED. 



military aud naval authonty, planted by the United States 
in the Philippine Islands. It was a subordinate, subsidi- 
ary, parasitic growth from the great stem of American 
power. 



l!>veDts l)e- 

tween May 19 

anil August 13, 

18'JS, when 

Manila was 

captured. 



Instruction 

of Secretary of 

State to 

Officials to 

make uo 

alliances with 

Aguinaldo. 



III. 

I will now consider the acts and events transpiring 
between the 19th of May, 1898, when Aguinaldo arrived 
at Manila, and the 13th of August, the date of the taking 
of Manila. Dewey cabled the Government that Aguinaldo 
had visited him and that he might render assistance. 
Washington had also heard from Wiliams, the Consnl- 
General at Manila, that the " insurgents of these islands " 
were making preparation for more successful war against 
Spain (Cong. Rec, 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 2512). The 
Administration, with great prudence, foresight, and good 
sense (for which they deserve infinite praise, not re- 
l)roach and contumely), immediately telegraphed, namely, 
on May 26th, to Dewey (as I have before stated, but 
think it important to state again in this connection), that : 
" It is desirable as far as x>ossihle and consistent for your 
success and safety, not to have any political alliances with the 
insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur lia- 
bility to maintain their cause in the future.'" 

To which, on the 6th of June, Dewey replied : 

" Have acted according to spirit of Deimrtment's instruc- 
tions from the beginning, and I have entered into no alliance 
with the insurgents or with any faction."" 

The same caution was given to Consul-General Pratt at 
Singapore, and the Secretary of State informed him that : 

" it would not, in accepting Aguinaldo'' s co-operation, con- 
sider itself pledged to recognize any piolitical claims which he 
might put forward." (June 13-16.) (Cong. Rec, ooth Cong., 
3d Sess., p. 2513.) 



THE ANTi.i.-\rri-:Rr.\risTs A.vsivF.A'F.n 21 

And ill a I'lirtlier letter to the same odiciul, it is said : 
"Tills Government has kiioioit the Philipinna iimurtjintH 
only as discontented subjects of Spain." (Senate DociinientH, 
No. G2, Part I., 55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. :551.) 

Pratt replied to the Department that he had 

" held out no hopes to him {A{/nin(ddo) of ani/ Ai/id,'^ &c. 

Wildman, our Consul-General at Hongkong, was in- 
structed to the same effect and replied in the same manner : 

" Never made j^ledges or discussed policy of America with 
Aguinaldo. " (Senate Documents, No. 62. Part I. ,55th Cong., 
3d Sess., p. 338.) 

It therefore overwhelmingly appears that all our offi- 
cials, Naval and Consulate, were distinctly informed in 
respect to the position which this Government held in 
regard to the Philippine Islands, and Aguinaldo had full 
and perfect notice that he would not be in anywise recog- 
nized by the Government. The Government wisely did 
not allow the grass to grow under its feet, but it promptly 
and broadly put itself upon record. It stamped out any 
pretense of existing recognition of Aguinaldo. It gave 
not the slightest encouragement to him — it placed itself 
upon the basis of its clear rights — it kept out of entangle- 
ments which Spain might have been glad to take advantage 
of when the time for settlement and treaty arrived. Not 
content with instructing our officials, the Government 
took the further precaution, through the Secretary of 
War, to proclaim its views to the whole people of the 
Philippine Islands; it was determined there should be no 
misunderstanding as to the precise relation whicii the 
Government of the United States occupied to them. On 
May, 19, 1898 — the very day Aguinaldo saw Dewey for 
thefirst time — the President issued instructions to the War ^ay r... isw. 
Department, which were conveyed for public proclama- oriSienrof 
tion to General Wesley Merritt, commanding the nrmv of towarDepan / 

' ... . ,,,, , . „ ' ineut announc- » 

occupation to the Philippines. llie relation of our ingsover- 

i ^ ^ eignty over 

country to the Filipinos is clearly stated in this important Philippines. 



22 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS AXSIVEKED. 

document, and our views set forth in accordance with the 
principles of international hiw ; indeed, tlie language 
seems to have been taken mrhatim et literatinn from a 
treatise on international law, because it follows so closely 
the doctrine laid down by all international law writers. 
Nothing can be clearer, nothing was more timely or 
proper, than this proclamation, which conveyed to the 
Filipinos the exact position wdiich they bore to the Gov- 
ernment of the United States. Tens of thousands of these 
proclamations were translated into Spanish and distributed 
among the people of those islands. (Congressional Record, 
55th Congress, 3d Sess., p. 2515.) I quote the gist of it — 
tliat part relevant to this branch of the discussion : 

" * * * The first effect of the miUtary occupation of the 
enemy's territory is the severance of the former political rela- 
tions of the inJiabitants and the establishment of a ne\o politi- 
cal power. [Here is a plain and distinct claim of sovereignty. ] 
Zander this changed condition of thinc/s, the inhabitants, so 
long as they perform their duties, are entitled to security/ in 
their persons and property ^ and in all their private rights and 
relations. It is ray desire that the people of the Philippines 
should be acquainted with the purpose of the United States 
to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in this regard. 
It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the expe- 
dition immediately upon his arrival in the islands, to publish 
a proclamation, declaring that we come 7iot to make war upon 
the peop>le of the Philippines^ nor upon any party or faction 
among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their em- 
ployments, and in their personal and religious rights. All 
persons who either by active aid or by honest submission co- 
operate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to 
this beneficent purpose, will receive the award of its support 
and protection. Our occupation should be as free from sever- 
ity as possible. * * * Thouglc the powers of the military 
occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate 
upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal 
laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of 
persons and property, and providing for the punishment of 



Coni|mrison 



THE AXTI-IMPERIAUSTS ANSWERED. 23 

crime, are considered as eontimiiiii,' in (oicc, so far as lliey 
are compatible with tin- new order of thiiit,'s, until they are 
suspended or supc-rsede<l l.y tiie oeeiipyinir l)('lliiri.,-t.,it ; and in 
practice tliey are not usually ahronrjvtod, hut are allowed to 
remain in foree and to be administered l»y tlu^ ordinary tri- 
bunals substantially as they were before the oeeupation. This 
enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on 
the present occasion." (Congressional Record, 55th Con- 
gress, 3rd Sess., p. 2514.) 

This was the forerunner of the "benevolent assimila- comparison 
tion " proclamation, so bitterly denounced by the Anti- rrocLtS^^^ 
Imperialists, and about which I shall have something to 
say further on ; but it will be noted that a comparison of 
the two proclamations shows that their language is almost 
identical ! While the war was at fever heat between Spain 
and this country, this proclamation was issued to pacify 
the inhabitants of these islands. It was inevitable that 
we should conquer these islands — Filipinos with, or 
Filipinos against us. We were not making war on these \\ 
people; we were driving out Spain. This proclamation 
told them so. It revealed our exact international relation 
to them. Was this wrong? Is there any criticism to be 
made of the President for the issuance of this proclama- 
tion? Was it not a beneficent, humane, prudent, friendly 
act to tender the olive branch to the people of these 
islands? Was it not consistent with the best policy to 
solicit and encourage, not merely their submission, but 
their hopes and friendship? At this time no one could 

know with certainty what would be the end of the war 

what would be the basis of settlement between the two 
Powers — whether we would hold the Philippines, or 
whether we would turn them over again to Spain. Still I 
presume there was little doubt on the question. 

Why do not these lynx-eyed Anti-Imperialists criticise 
this first "benevolent assimilation" proclamation? If 
the second was bad, this one was equally so. 



24 



THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 



June 10. 1S98, 
AguinaMi)''s 
letter to the 
President. 



Aguinaldo 
never believed 
United States 
Government 
would ac- 
knowledge his 
Government. 



On the lOth of Jane, 1898, we have a most significant 
letter from Aguinaldo to the President of the United 
States, in which he thanked the nation for the efficient 
and disinterested protection which it was giving, and 
begged and protested that the " Government of the United 
States would retain these islands until the end of the war, 
and if Spain fails to pay the indemnity, will (not) sell 
them to an European Power, preferably Great Britain." — 
(Senate Doc. No. 62, part I., 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 360). 

It will be remembered that there was some wild talk in 
America of turning over these islands to Great Britain. 
Aguinaldo at that time was only interested in having them 
retained by this Government; he then, apparently, was 
willing to fully and freely acquiesce in our having pos- 
session of them, but he did not want them disposed of to 
any other Power, and he begged us, in behalf of a "people 
which trusts blindly in you, not to abandon it to the 
tyranny of Spain." 

In face of all these facts, it is impossible to believe 
Aguinaldo when he asserts that he received any encour- 
agement from our officials or officers in the East that this 
Government would recognize him and the Filipinos as an 
independent government. Read the emphatic utterances 
of Dewey, Pratt and Wildman — and how can the naked 
word of Aquinaldo prevail against them? Instructed 
clearly and emphatically from Washington to enter into 
no entangling alliances, it is highly improbable that any 
of them would give him encouragement. Nay, I assert 
that a careful study of the facts shows that he never be- 
lieved, even from the beginning, that this Government 
would acknowledge his independence. It is an after- 
thought on his part if he says so. Else why the secret 
conspiracy of May 4th, 1898? And he is condemned out of 
the mouths of his own friends and officers, one of whom 
testified : 

" A sliort time afterwards (after July, 1898), as soon as he 
had some forces, be proclaimed independence in the few towns 



THE A A' ri-iMrrniA /. /s ys a xs wfrrd. 



25 



wliich he h;ul procured willioiit llie <»iii>«iiL of Adiiiinil 
Dewey, at whose orders he had come, and the first time I 
presented myself to liim I heard from his own lips that neither 
Admiral Dewey nor any other American liad ever promised 
him such independence." — (Vol. II., Report Philippine Com- 
mission, p. 381.) 

So far, then, as the case of the Anti-Iinneriiilists rests I'muvi kun-s 

_ ^ * n«'v»'r u(fn*«Ml 

Upon promises — verbal or written, inii)lie(l or expressed, amiUwuIu/b 
inferential or direct — that the United States would give or <^"v<Tiimeut. 
recognize the independence of Aguinaldo's government, it 
is absolutely without foundation. It has not a leg tc) 
stand upon. The denials are not equivocal or doubtful ; 
they are direct, sweeping and overwhelming. 

Mr. Schurz is nervously anxious, constantly demanding, 
that some one would appear to discuss the facts with him. 
That anxiety and wish I am now gratifying. And with 
all of the evidence before me (and whi'^h I now tender and 
open to him) I proclaim that I shall be able to show that 
in his statement of all of the material facts and principles 
of law he is mistaken — wrong — misled far away from the 
the paths of truth. 
He says : 

" While so profiting from the co-operation of the Filipinos 
as our military allies against the ' common enemy,' we know 
that the Filipinos lielieved that, fighting side by side with the 
Republic of Washington and Lincoln, they were fighting for 
their own independence. We had every reason for knowing 
that had the}'' not so believed they would have acted dif- 
ferently."— (N. Y. Times, July 25, 1900.) 

This is not correct. The facts condemn every material Filipinos never 
word of the statement. The Filipinos believed otherwise, '^'wwrid U*^^ 
because they were told otherwise by our Generals and 
officers — by every one of them, as I have shown and shall 
show hereafter. Aguinaldo seized the occasion of tiiis 
war between Spain and the United States to put himself 
in motion. It released him from exile. It gave him arms. 



recognized. 



2(3 



THE AXTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 



It enabled hiui under our protection to gather around him 
troops. But at eoery step of his game he encountered 
the clear, plain, unmistakable utterances of our Generals, 
who refused to acknowledge his military or civil power or 
to give him any encouragement. Finding the road to his 
ambition was blocked, this bold, bad adventurer coldly, 
deliberately, with the premeditation of a murderer, cruelly 
plunged his unhappy countrymen in the most useless and 
suicidal rebellion ever waged — waged against their 
friends, who stood before them with the olive branch of 
friendship, and who were seriously engaged in the hu- 
mane occupation of discovering what was best for their 
advancement, progress, health, education and liberty! 



IV. 



Discussion of 

Aguinaldo's 

dictatorial 

Constitution. 



I wish now to discuss an eventof the 23d of June, 1898, 
separately. This date is important only because a consti- 
tution was dictated and promulgated by Aguiualdo at that 
time. 

What effect and influence has this document upon the 
merits of the Philippine question? In the flrst place, it was 
not the work of the people of the Philippine Islands. It 
was not the result of a plehiscitum— a vote — an official 
consensus of opinion of the people. It is a document dic- 
tatorially prepared by an individual — Aguinaldo, and 
promulgated by him to give the world the assurance that 
a government existed in the Philij^pines. I invoke the 
testimony of the Vice-President of the Congress : 

" This Congress was made up by Aguinaldo. All the mem- 
bers may be said to have been appointed. There was not an 
election. There were a very few members who were elected 
by the people, but a great inajority were appointed by Agui- 
naldo, and naturally the decisions of the Congress had to be as 
Aguinaldo desired. 



THE AMTI-IMrERIAI.lSTS A X I.WER l-.D. 27 

Q. Did Aguinaklu have tho i)o\vei- to iciiiove iiifiiihcrs tliat 
did not vote to suit his wishes ? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. Did he ever employ this riglit ? 

A. Yes, sir; he appointed me Vice-President of tlie Con- 
gress * * * 

Q. What importance did the Congress acluully have 'i Were 
its decrees put into effect or were they overruled by Aguinaldo 
and his Cabinet when they were not pleasing to tlu'ni ? 

A. Whatever Aguinaldo wished. 

Q. I wish to know whether the Congress was dominated by 
Aguinaldo and his Cabinet or not ? 

A. Coin2)letely. " 

(Vol. II., Report Philippine Commission, pp. 386-7.) 

At most, this constitution of Aguinaldo was but a 
proposition, to be adopted or rejected by the people. It 
had no efficacy or force until it was formally accejjted 
either by direct ratification or by the people living 
under it. 

" A de facto government is one actually existing in a state 
and for the time possessing sufficient strength to exercise sov 
ereign powers." (Davis' Elements of International Law, 
p. 34.) 

But there could be neither a de facto nor a de jure gov- 
ernment established under the circumstances which pre- 
vailed in the Philippines at this period — at least not with- 
out the consent of the Government of Spain or of the 
United States. A war was in existence at this date, June, 
1898, between the United States and Spain — Spain known 
to the world and recognized as the sole sovereign of these 
islands. If the United States prevailed, she need not, 
under principles of international law, recognize a third 
sovereignty — established without her consent; and the 
same view would apply to Spain. The paper constitution 
put forth by the dictator, Aguinaldo, in the midst of this 
war, vs^as therefore inefficacious for any purpose — except 



28 THE A XTI IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

SO far as it might be vivified into a living government by 
the ratification of the people of the Philippine Islands, 
when authorized and approved by the United States or 
Spain, whichever should prove to be the ultimate victor. 

The pax^er government inaugurated by A.guinaldo could 
receive no recognition as a government de facto or de jure 
from outside sovereignties or Powers. Suppose Aguinaldo 
had sent a representative to the Government of France or 
England, liow^ would he have been received? Would 
either of those Powers have recognized a government cre- 
ated under such circumstances? France would have said 
to the representative : ' ' Who are you ? " " What is your 
government? " " The Philippine Islands belong to Spain." 
" Do you claim to have carried through a successful revo- 
lution?" "Where is the evidence of a plebiscitum — a 
vote of the people?" "Spain is the sovereign of those 
islands? " "If she is not, then they belong to the victor, 
the United States." " How can you intervene between 
these two Powers to take advantage of the weakness of 
Spain or the strength of the United States, without the 
consent of either or both? " 

"A Sovereign State may therefore be defiaed to be any 
nation or people organized into a body politic and exercising 
the rights of self government." (Baker's First Steps in Inter- 
national Law, p. 24.) 

The most that could be claimed for this constitution by 
Aguinaldo would be, that by ratification by the people — 
by approval of the United States or of Spain — it might 
in time ripen into a government. It was hardly worthy of 
being called a healthy seed which could produce fruit in 
the political soil in which it was sowed by Aguinaldo. 
AKuinaido'8 Tlieu, it Is Urged that Aguinaldo procured and adopted 
a flag — which was displayed on boats running in and about 
Manila Bay — and which was recognized and respected by 
our navy and army. Aguinaldo's story of the flag is as 
follows : 



Flag. 



THE ANri-IMrERIAI.lSTS ANSWEREIK 2'.> 

"Then the Admiral advised me to at oiutc liave made a 
Filipino National Flag, which he said he would recognize an<l 
protect in the presence of the other nations represented ijy the 
various squadrons anchored in Manila Bay, adding, however, 
that he thought it advisable that we should destroy the power 
of Sjxdn before hoisting our national flag." (The Story Told 
by Aguinaldo, p. 10.) 

"In conformity with ray orders, issued on the 1st of Sep- 
tember (1898), all Philippine vessels hoisted the national flag, 
the marines of the Filipino flotilla being the first to execute 
that order." {Ibid., p. 15.) 

Under the circumstances disclosed, this llag was one for 
protection merely — it could represent nothing but the dis- 
tinct troops and property of the insurgents. It had no 
significance or meaning in international law. It would 
not be recognized by any foreign Power. It had no more 
effect than the flag of a brigade or regiment. It existed 
only by virtue of the permission of the United States. It 
was used for convenience to distinguish it from the Si)an- 
ish flag. It could be used later — when a real, bona fide 
government was created — as a national ensign. A flag of 
a sovereign Power, in international law, carries with it 
respect and protection. Aguinaldo's flag was in no sense a 
national emblem, because it carried no rights or protection 
— except so far as it was guarded by the United States Gov- 
ernment. This paper constitution and this ineffectual Jlag 
are boldly pu t forward as evidence of the existence of a gov- 
ernment, and it is claimed in effect that because one of the 
officers of the United States received one of these constitu- 
tions, and authorized and knew of the existence of tiiis 
Hag — because Dewey accepted one of these flags as a 
momento— a souvenir— that the people of the United 
States are estopped from questioning the existence of 
Aguinaldo's alleged government; that is, they seek to 
create a government by estoppel. Political States or Sov- 
ereignties are not created that way. 



30 



THE ANTI-JMPEKIALISTS ANSWERED. 



ApiiinoJdo 
never believed 
independence 
would be ac- 
knowledged by 
United States. 



V. 

In this connection I now come to examine a statement 
of Mr. iSchiirz, to this effect: 

" While so profiting from the co-operation of the Filipinos 
as our military a^^^V^' against the common enemy, rue knoxo that 
the Filipinos believed that, fighting side by side with the 
republic of Washington and Lincoln, they were fighting for 
their own independence. We had every reason for knowiny 
tJtat had they not so believed, they loould have acted differently . 
Our Government permitted them to believe that this independ- 
ence loould be the otitcome of a common victory over the com- 
mon enemy, and meanwhile it continued to accept the benefit 
of their co-operation, which was based upon that belief. " 
(New York Times, July 5>5th, 1900.) 

I characterize this statement as false, not imputing, of 
course, to Mr. Schurz any wilful intention of making 
averments that he did not believe to be true, but he has 
concentrated in this small paragraph the false views which 
have been recklessly circulated in the community by the 
Anti-imperialistic League. I do charge Mr. Schurz with a 
failure to intently and carefully study the facts before 
circulating such a statement under his own powerful 
name. The Filipinos, in the first place, never fought " side 
by side " with our troops. The present war against the 
United States Government was planned at Hongkong 
on the 4th of May, 1898, before Aguinaldo had entered 
the field — after they knew of the defeat of the Spanish 
fleet at Manila — and before they co-operated in any man- 
ner with the United States Government. This cabal, clique 
or coterie of conspirators, determined then and there to 
wage war against the United States if Aguinaldo was not 
recognized as representing the whole of the Philippine 
Islands. (Con. Record, HOth Congress, 1st Sess., p. 2773; 
The Story Told by Aguinaldo, p. 10, Senate Document No. 
208, Part II., 56th Cong., 1st Session, p. 5.) Why was 
this meeting held in advance of any talk with Dewey or 



THE AN TI- IMPERIA LIS TS A XSi\- Eh' /■:/). 



31 



our officers if Aguinuldo believed tlie United States would 
recognize him? The secret meeting of these conspirators 
was only necessary because tliey felt they could not be 
recognized and they were determined to push their pre- 
tensions, even to a war with the great power of this Gov- 
ernment. 

The correspondence, however, between our officers and 
Aguinaldo shows that they gave him no encouragement 
whatever, and it is absolutely incorrect, as stated by Mr. 
Schurz, that 

" Our Government permitted them to believe that this inde- 
pendence would be the outcome of a common victory over the 
common enemy, and meanwhile it continued to accept the 
benefit of their co-operation, which was based upon that be- 
lief," (New York Times, July 2oth, 1900.) 

I shall show its falsity from every source. Aguinaldo, 
from the beginning, used the United States Government 
in every conceivable way to perfect his own plans, to in- 
crease and discipline his own army, to arm the insurgents 
and to carefully and skilfully place himself in a position 
where he could put forth the claim to represent the whole 
eight or ten million people of the Philippine Islands. As 
one of his friends and officers said : 

" He had no promise of it, and he had no hope of getting 
it, and he would not have been able to make war at all, or, in 
in fact, get here without the aid offered him by the blockade 
of the American squadron," (Vol. II., Rep. Philippine Com., 
p. 381.) 

The correspondence, however, between our officers and 
Aguinaldo clearly and emphatically shows that they gave 
him no encouragement whatever. There is no doubt that 
he did everything in his power to procure recognition, but 
it came not. What did come was an absolute ii\\(\.x>ereuip- 
tory refusal to recognize him either as a ciml or military 
'power in the Philippines. Considering all the facts, look- 
ing at all the surrounding circumstances, this position was 



Tlif corre- 

sjxniileiicc lie- 

twfcii AKiii- 

iialili) and the 

Uiiit<'(i States 

Military 

Omc'iTS n-fus- 

in;; to recoK- 

ni/.e him. 



32 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

right and just to all interested— just to ourselves as a 
sovereign nation— just to the inhabitants of the Philip- 
pines, who were under our protection — just to Spain, with 
whom we were engaged in wai', and from whom no terms 
had yet been vouchsafed or offered. 

Let us take up the correspondence. These letters began 
on July 4th, 1898. The first is from General Anderson to 
" Senor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, Commanding 
Philippine Forces, Favite, Luzon. 

General: I have the honor to inform you that the United 
States of America, whose land forces I have tlie honor to 
command in this vicinity, being at war witli the Kingdom of 
Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for 
the native 2->eople of the Philippine Islands. 

For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations 
with you., and to have you and your people co-operate with us 
in military operations against the Spanish forces. 

In our operations it has become necessary for us to occupy 
the town of Cavite as a base of operations. In doing this I 
do not wish to interfere with your residence here and the ex- 
ercise by yourself and other native citizens of all functions 
and privileges not inconsistent with military rule. * * * 
I have therefore the honor to ask your excellency to instruct 
your officials not to interfere with my officers in the j)erform- 
ance of their duties and not to assume that they ca^mot visit 
Cavite xoithout permission^ (Senate Doc. 208, 56th Cong., 
1st Sess. , p. 4.) 

To which Aguinaldo replied, expressing great satisfac- 
tion for the sympathy and amicable sentiments contained 
in the letter, and said : 

" I have already ordered my people not to interfere in the 
least with your officers and men, orders which I shall reiterate 
to prevent their being unfulfilled; hoping that you will inform 
me whatever misconduct that may be done by those in my 
command, so as to reprimand them and correspond with your 
wishes." {Ihid., ]>. 5.) 



THE AXTl-rMPEK/A/JSTS AXSWERED. 33 

On .luly (Jtli, General Anilerson again addiussed Agui- 
naldo, stating: 

" Very soon we expect a large addition to our forces, and 
it must be apparent to you as a nnlitary officer tliat we will 
require more room to camp our soldiers, and also store- 
room for our su])plics. For this I would like to have yoiu' 
excellency's advice atid co operation, as you are best acquainted 
with the resources of this country. 

It must be apparent to you that we do not intend to remain 
here inactive, but to move promptly against our common 
enemy." {Ibid., p. 5.) 

On the 9th of July, General Anderson wrote to the 
Adjutant-General of the United States Army at Washing- 
ton in relation to Aguinaldo, stating : 

" When we first landed he seemed very suspicious and not 
at all friendly. But I have now come to a better understand- 
ing with him, and he is much more friendly and seems willing 
to co-operate. But he has declared himself dictator and 
president and is trying to take Matiila icithout our assistance. 
This is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will, 
I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish 
a provisional government.''' {Ibid., p. 6.) 

On July 14th he again addressed Aguinaldo : 

" Wishing to get complete information of the approaches to 
Manila from every direction, I therefore have the honor to 
request that you give my officers all possible assistance in 
making reconnaissance to the lines and approaches, and that 
you favor them with your advice." {Ibid., p. 6.) 

On July 17th, the Quartermaster, Major-General Jones, 
addressed a letter to Aguinaldo : 

" We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transporta- 
tion, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this 
we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so 
far that the native population are not willing to give us this 
assistance as promptly as required, But we must have it, and 
if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties 



34 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS AXSIVERED. 

to seize what we ma}' need. We would regret very much to 
do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation 
has spent millions of money to send forces here to expel the 
Spaniards and to give good government to the whole people 
and the return we are asking is comparatively slight." {Ibid., 
p. 7.) 

There was no response to this letter, and it was followed 
by another on July 23d, from the Brigadier-General of the 
United States Army to Aguinaldo, to this effect : 

" When I came here three weeks ago, I requested your 
Excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means 
of transportation for the American Army, as it was to tight 
the cause of your people. So far we have received no response. 
As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make 
requisition directly on j'ou for 500 horsed and 50 oxen and ox- 
carts." {Ibid., p. 11.) 

These facts had been previously reported to the Govern- 
ment at Washington by General Anderson on July 21st, 
in the following letter : 

"Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an 
elaborate system of military government, tinder his assumed 
authority as dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being 
given us exce2)t by his order. * * * jjig assumption of 
civil authority I have ignored and let him knoio verbally that 
I could and icoidd not recognize it, while I did not recognize 
him as a military leader. It seems strange that I have made 
no formal protest against his proclamation as dictator, his 
declaration of martial law, and publication and execution of a 
despotic form of government. I Avrote such a protest, but did 
not })ul)lish it at Admiral Dewey's request, and also for fear 
of wounding the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt. 
But I have let it be knoxon in every other xoay that ve do not 
recognize the dictatorship."" {Ibid.,Tp\:>. 12-13.) 

On the 24th of July, Aguinaldo addressed General 
Anderson in respect to furnishing horses, buffaloes and 
carts, explaining why he luul not resjjonded, and said : 

" I have circulated orders in the provinces in the ])roximity 



riiE an7/-/.]/j'j:a'/.u./s-/s a \ sir /■:/,'/■:/>. ;55 

tliiit in the sliorlest time possildi' horses be hroiit^'ht fur sah', 
but I cannot assure your Excellency tliat we have llie number 
of 500 that is needed, because liorses are not abundant in tlicse 
vicinities, owing to deaths caused by epizootic diseases in 
January and March hist." (Tf'kl., \>. 12.) 

General Anderson replied to thi.s letter and stated to 
Aguinaldo on the same day : 

"I regret that there should have been any misunderstanding 
about it. The people to whom we applied even for the hiring 
of caramates, etc., told our people that tlieij had orders to sup- 
ply nothing except by yoxir orders,'''' {Ibid., p. 12.) 

On August 1, 1898, Aguinaldo wrote to Mr. Williams, 
Consul at Manila, stating: 

"I pray you earnestly, as also tlie distinguished Generals 
who represent your country in these islands, that you entreat 
the Government at Washington to recognize the revolutionary 
government of the Filipinos." {Ibid.., p. 16.) 

Aguinaldo was also informed by General Anderson, as 
follows, in relation to the treatment which he had com- 
plained about : 

" If you apparently have been treated harshly it is from 
military necessity and not for want of confidence. We had to 
take Manila to effect the purpose of our war. While we may 
admit the justice of your insurrection, to prevent all possible 
complications, still it is thought judicious and necessary to have 
only one army in Manila at once. The Government of the 
United States, you may be assured, which, as its agent, I can 
make no promises, will deal fairly with the Filipinos, but we 
must now insist, for the good of all, there shall be no joint 
occupation of Manila. * * * We most earnestly and sincerely 
hope and trust that there may be no conflict between us, but 
we are prepared to enforce our orders in this matter and expect 
from time to time large additions to our strength. We desire 
most sincerely to remain friendly with the Filipinos, and have 
nothing but their best interests at heart in all our dealings 
with them." {Ibid.,\^^. 18-19.) 



36 THE AX'n-JMPERIAI.ISTS ANSWERED. 

On August 24th, 1898, Major-Geueral Wesley Merritt 
addressed Aguinaldo as follows : 

•' So far as any promises as to lohat should be done in the 
event of a conclusion of a treaty hetioeen the United States and 
SjMiin are concerned, it is utterly impossible for me as the 
military representative only of the United States to make any 
promises such as you request. As you have already been in- 
formed., you may depend upon the good-will of the Americans 
out here and the Government.^ of which you already know the 
beneficence., to determine these matters in the future.''^ [Ibid., 
p. 24.) 

On the 27tli of August, Aguinaldo addressed a letter to 
General Wesley Merritt, in which he begged him to 

" reclaim from Admiral Dewey the protection of our sliips from 
free navigation and permit me to insist if you wish upon the 
restitution of the position that we are now going to leave if in 
the treaty of peace to be celebrated between Spain and the 
United States they acknowledge the dominion of Spain in the 
Philippines." [Ibid., p. 26.) 

I have given as much of this corresx>ondence as is neces- 
sary to throw light upon the thoughts, motives and acts 
of both Aguinaldo and the officers of the United States 
Army, with whom he had the corresxwndence. These 
letters show the extent and spirit of Aguinaldo's co-opera- 
tion. The letters, beginning with the reciprocal expres- 
sions of good-will and conMence in each other, inevitably 
tapered off into questions of right and duty. Aguinaldo 
was laboring for recognition of a revolutionary, independ- 
ent government. Generals Anderson, Merritt and Otis 
were equally positive in declining to make such promises. 
and positively refused to recognize either the civil or 
military authority. I invite any one who is not satis- 
fied on this point to read this whole correspondence 
with care. Jt will be seen Aguinaldo cannot put his 
finger upon a solitary expression or point to an Isolated 
act which could cause him to helleoe that he would he 



THE ANTI-IMrhNlAI ISrS A N SW EN I: l> 37 

recognized. His co-oi)ei'ation cousistetl in hi.s (lt',sulL(jiy 
operations against the Spaniards, made easy by the pres- 
ence ol' our troops and the moral inliuence of our [>o\ver. 
The assertion, tlierefore, tliat " Our Governnieiit permitted 
them to believe that this independence would be the out- 
come oC a common victory " is false as a statement of ex- 
press agreement — it is false as a general fact — it is false 
as a deduction or inference. His belief must have been 
that he would not be recognized. The correspondence 
sliows that he was an Impediment — not an ally. 



VI. 

Now I take up the question of the co-operation and ser- AK'uiMiii.i..-8 
vices that Aguinaldo rendered to the Americans. I will with Amer- 
not detract from them one jot or tittle. The Anti-Imperi- 
alists, through Mr. Schurz, make this broad claim : 

" The co-operation of the Filipino forces against the com- 
mon enemy was most effective. While our troops were gradu- 
ally arriving, they crip})led the common enemy as we could 
not possibly have crippled huu with our strength then at hand. 
They made themselves masters of the entire island of Luzon, 
outside of Manila, and of other important parts of the Archi- 
pelago, so that the Spanish power substantially ceased to exist 
there. They took many thousands of Spanish prisoners, and 
they so hemmed in the Spanish forces in Manila on the land 
side, that they could not receive reinforcements or escape into 
the interior, while we blockaded Manila on the sea side. Thus 
the Filipino army became one of the decisive factors in the 
capture of that city." (New York Times, July 2oth, 1900.) 

This is an exaggerated view of the services which these 
Filipinos rendered to us, and it is entirely against the 
opinion of our officers there, as can be found in their let- 
ters ; the military work of the Filipinos was of no such 



38 THE AA'Tl-IMPERlAI.ISrs ANSWERED. 

iaipoitance as is x^ortrayed by their friends. The state- 
ment is made the basis of a charge that 

"we used the Filipinos as allies — that we profited from their 
co-operation as allies, and in point of fact recognized and 
treated them as allies so long as the}'^ could be useful to us, 
and that therefore loe oxoed to them those moral obligations 
xchich are alioays recognhxd hehceen honorable allies." (New 
York ITerakl July 14th, 1900.) 

I am compelled to say that in almost every statement 
that Mr. Schurz makes there is an error of fact, and where 
he undertakes to deduce a principle of law, as applicable 
to such false or suppositious facts, he is necessarily and 
logically wrong. 
Filipinos not He says that the Filipinos were our allies. I deny this 

allies of .. 'tt -t- 

United States, propositiou. They aided us; but they were auxiliaries oi 
which we availed ourselves, as we would have availed our- 
selves of every other factor which we found at hand — dis- 
tinctly, openly and emphatically at all times repudiating 
any idea of alliance or of present or future recognition. 
In the first place an ally signifies an independent state or 
sovereign power. Chancellor Kent defines an ally to be: 
" A nation which has entered into an alliance with another 
nation." (1 Kent's Com., 69.) 

And all other definitions agree with this. 

" A term impljang in a military sense any nation united "to 
another under a treaty, aggressive or defensive, or both." 
Farrow's Military Dictionary. 

" A prince or a state united to another by treaty. " Hamers- 
ley's Naval Encyclopedia. 

" A state or prince bound to one by a treaty or league — a 
confederacy." Imperial Dictionary. 

"A state, sovereignity or chief leagued with another by 
treaty, agreement by treaty, agreement or common action." 
Standard Dictionary. 

" One united to another by treaty or league — usually applied 



THE AMTI-IMrF.k'IAI.lSTS A XS1l'/:A'F./>. 30 

to sovereigns or states — a confederate." Webster's Dietion- 
ary. 

" One united to another by kinship, treaty or league — a con- 
federate — more particularly a soveriiign or state connected 
with another by league, aggressive or defensive — or a subject 
or a citizen of such sovereign or state." Century Dictionary. 

" One united or associated with another b}' treaty or league 
— usually applied to sovereigns and states." Philological Dic- 
tionary. 

The term " ally" is applied, then, to a created and or- 
ganized government in the sense of international law — this 
is the sense and meaning of the term as generally used. I 
do not claim that this meaning of the term is absolute — 
prohibitive of others— there may be cases with peculiar 
circumstances surrounding them where exceptions may be 
created, but Aguinaldo's paper government could not be 
made one of these exceptions so as to constitute him in 
any sense an " ally " of the United States. It was not in 
a condition, in such a state of creation, progress or de- 
velopment, when it would be recognized by any foreign 
Power or Government. His was a wholly anomalous crea- 
tion ; not a politic body, but a dictatorial assertion. It is 
absolutely exceptional in the history of international law ; 
it swung between the Spanish and the United States Gov- 
ernments—recognizing, and recognized by, neither. In 
the lexicography and meaning of international law it has 
no recognized place or name. If Spain conquered the 
United States, Aguinaldo was in rebellion against Spain ; 
if Spain w^ere conquered, he was, as he is, in rebellion 
against the United States. If he were an ally, he would 
have been taken into the councils of our military and 
naval officers, and his views and opinions would have been 
considered and recognized in the movements of the forces. 
We would have co-operated. As a matter of fact he 
never participated jointly with the United States in any 
eno-acrement— they never acted together in a single in- 



40 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

Stance. To claim he was an ally is an absolute assump- 
tion. But, irrespective of these considerations, there are 
other reasons why Aguinaldo was in no sense an ally of 
the United States. He was not united or joined to it by 
any agreement or league or confederacy or common pur- 
pose, which is the usual method of creating an alliance. 

But assuming (and I do not dispute the fact) that tiiere 
might under certain circumstances exist an implied agree- 
ment by which governments may operate together as indi- 
viduals, without a written contract, and their rights and 
duties be afterwards determined by the rules of equity and 
justice, Mr. Schurz makes this point, and I will squarely 
meet it. He says : 

" That the Filipinos, before co-operating with us as allies 
against the common enemy 'Spain,' did not insist upon stipu- 
lating with us in black and white the conditions of the co- 
operation, but confidingly trusted our honor and good faith as 
republicans of the school of Washington and Lincoln, is true 
just as I might go into a business operation with a friend with- 
out a written contract, believing him to bean honest man; but 
what shall I believe him to be if, after having accepted the 
benefit of my co-operation, he repudiates all moral obligations 
on the ground that, trusting his honesty, I had neglected to in- 
sist upon a written contract ? Such a person may occasionally 
by some quibble of legal technicality escape the payment of a 
just debt, but he will surely not escape the contempt of 
gentlemen." (New York Herald, July 14, 1900.) 

Mr. Schurz states the case of an implied contract — an 
implied alliance — and he claims that the facts justify him 
in asserting that an implied alliance existed betAveen the 
Filipinos and the United States Government. But what 
was the nature of this implied alliance between the Filipinos 
and the United States Government? An implied contract 
must be proved, just as an express one. You must show 
that the facts are sufficient to raise a presumption that an 
agreement existed of some kind. Now, what was the im- 



THE AN7'I-fMI'ERrA[JSTS A N SW l:R F. D. W 

plied alliance? What was the retuni which the l-'iliitiiios 
were to get for their services? 

The Filipinos were dissatisfied witli Spanish nih'. which 
was unfair, which was tyrannical. Tliey were denied, lin^y 
claimed, the two great and fnndaniental piinciples of 
modern civilization — representation in the Spanish Cortes 
and a free press : besides, they had other ills to redress. 
These they sought to reform in the insurrection of 180G; 
but as the wrongs still existed, they welcomed tiie war 
between Spain and the United States. 

Now to come directly to the question : Did the United 
States, in availing itself of the Filipinos" assistance, agree 
to give them recognition and independence? Where is the 
evidence to support such a contention, remembering the 
denials of Consul-General Pratt, of Consul Wildman, of 
Admiral Dewey? Recall all the letters, recur to the em- 
phatic and imperative directions of our State Department, 
and where is there anything to support an implied con- 
tract and alliance, except the fact of this naked alleged 
co-operation? And how can any one claim that the Fili- 
pinos believed that they were fighting for independence 
when every official with whom they came in contact dis- 
tinctly and peremptorily refused to make any promise to 
them, or to recognize in any manner their claims of sov- 
ereignty or independence? It takes two to make every con- 
tract—there must be a meeting of minds, as lawyers say. 
Did Aguinaldo render the services upon the assumption 
that he would be recognized? No, it is impossible, because 
he was plainly told so by our officers, who positively and 
expressly refused to recognize either his civil or military 
power. He may have thought that he could slide in be- 
tween Spain and the United States— and no doubt that 
was the predominating idea in his mind— but he was mis- 
taken. Did we accept his services under an assumption 
or belief that we would politically recognize him? All of 
the evidence is against this view. Mr. Schurz says that 



42 THE ANTI-IMPEKIAIJSTS ANSWERED. 

we are bound in duty to do something for these Filipinos; 
he claims " we owed to them those moral obligations which 
are always recognized between honorable allies." What 
are the moral obligations which are always recognized be- 
tween honorable allies? I can find no moral obligations 
which are recognized between honorable allies, except to 
keep their engagements and agreements and treaties and 

Our duties to promises. It is undoubtedly true that in accepting the 
'^stat'eT^^ services of the Filipinos, whether they were great or small, 
the United States Government was bound to feed, pay, 
maintain and protect them. It was bound to do more 
than this. It was bound to give them a government differ- 
ent and better than that which they had experienced from 
Spanish domination. It was bound to allow a free press. 
It was bound to establish courts. It was bound to allow 
the exercise of religious worship and of all those other 
essential rights which a civilized government takes pleas- 
ure in granting to those who come under its power and 
domination. All of these rights the government of the 
United States sought to create and perpetuate, because, 
as far back as May 19th, 1898, before Manila had fallen, 
the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the army and 
navy of the United States, proclaimed to the people of 
these islands that the Government of the United States in- 
tended to confer upon them all rights and privileges not 
incompatible with the actual prevalence of war. And no- 
where in this history does the humanity, the honesty of 
purpose, the real statesmanship of the President, shine 
with such conspicuous effect as in this connection — with 
his efforts to advance all of the interests of the Filipinos, 
political, moral, religious, commercial. 
Spain's On the 29th of August, 1898, the Spanish Government 

''thTspanish^ applied to Secretary Day at Washington through the 

pri.soners^ie pj.gj^QJj Ambassador and requested that tlie Spanish troops 

United States ^, nr-i iiii • p i^i 

refused. taken at Manila and held as prisoners ol war by the 
United States might be placed at the disposal of Spain to 



THE A.\T[-IM ri:Nl.ll.lSTS A\S\VEl>:i-:i). \'\ 

be used by her against the liisurg<uit Filipinos: What 
was the answer? The Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. 
Moore, replied tliat it could not be exjjected that tiie 
United States could even consider such a proposition 

"in view of tlie fact that for some thne before the 8»rreii<ler 
of Manila the Spanish forces in that city were besieged by 
the insurgents by land, wliile the port was blockaded by the 
forces of the United States by sea. " 

Do these Anti-Imperialists talk of our owing to the 
Filipinos " those moral obligations which are always recog- 
nized between honorable allies?" Here is a payment in 
full of the debt. Here is complete evidence that the 
United States was constantly looking after their interests 
— that they always had them at heart. 

And they recklessly and cruelly charge that the Presi- 
dent turned the " much- vaunted war of liberation into a 
war of conquest and criminal aggression! " 

What was the real great motive on the part of the Motive of ti.e 
Government in retaining the Philippines? I quote from ^n'rnafilfng' 
a speech made by Judge George Gray, a man of the most 
distinguished character as a jurist and statesman, and a 
Democrat, who was one of the Peace Commissioners at 
Paris : 

" The acquisition of territory by the United States was not 
one of the objects of war, and we solemnly declared in the 
resolution of Congress that our only object in demanding the 
relinquishment of the sovereignty of Cuba b}' Spain was not 
to hold it ourselves, except that we might pacify it, an<l tit it 
for self-government by its own people. 

But in this, as in all else, ' man proposes, God disposes,' 
and it is one of the things that make thoughtful men desire to 
avoid war, where it can be avoided, for no one can tell what 
its consequences may be. I ardently desired that we might 
escape the fiecessiti/ oftaki)i<f the Philippine Islands and assum- 
ing the burden that their taking will impose upon us, and I 
know that the President of the United States was eqaalli/ 
anxious to the same end. But it became apparent that, with- 



Pliili|>|iiiies. 



44 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

out our seeing, unexpected conditions liad been created, and 
out of these conditions, unquestionably, duties bad sprung 
whicli could not be avoided or evaded by the United States. 

Commodore Dewey had brought Aguinaldo back to Luzon, 
and by his leadership and the encouragement of the American 
fleet, the embers of the insurrection, which had died out, were 
rekindled into a flame, and the assistance of the insurgent 
forces was gladly availed of by our Commodore. It then came 
to be thought that in our settlement with Spain we could not 
honorably leave the inhabitants of these islands to the tender 
mercies of their Spanish oppressors and hand over brave men, 
who had assisted our fleet and army in the hour of need, to 
Spanish dungeons, or to the firing line of Spanish execution, 
I know that that situation appealed to the heart of your Presi- 
dent, and that he believed he was representing American man- 
hood and American character when he said, as finally he did, 
that, whatever became of those islands and those people, it was 
not in our blood to hand them back to Spain. It was a feel- 
ing of this kind, I know, that animated the Government of 
Mr. McKinley in coming to this important conclusion. Recog- 
nizing the burden, appreciating the responsibility, and ignoring 
the perils that possibly confronted us, he said, and I know he 
felt, that, whatever else might be the fate of these islands and 
of this people, he could not put our country in the attitude of 
deserting those whom he had placed in a new position of antago- 
nism to their rulers. 

It was argued that the performance of duty is sometimes not 
only unpleasant, but has dangers attendant upon it; neverthe- 
less, a brave man and a brave nation will not shrink from it on 
that account. On the other hand, if American sentiment did 
not justify the return of these islands to Spain, no more could 
it justify leaving them derelict in the Eastern Ocean, the prey 
of the first occupant, of European rapacity. The powers of 
Europe would acquiesce in our taking them, but they would 
not stand by and see them in their helpless condition of anar- 
chy and disorder without seizing the opportunity to aggrandize 
themselves, and so it was thought best by the President and 
his advisers to take the cession of their sovereignty from Spain, 
and hold it in trust, to be administered in conformity with those 



THE A\'ri-iMi'i'.i<iAi.isrs Axswi-.Ni-.n 45 

high iduals and liberty-loving tradilions which aniinalc and 
glorify the history of our country. 

Duty cannot honorably be avoided because it may bring pain 
or danger. Nor can responsibility always be eva<led because 
of its burdens. 

That I sought in Paris, by all honorable means, to escape this 
responsibility does not matter now. It came to a point at last 
that we must either leave the islands to Spain, take them as wc 
did, or break off negotiations and come honie without a treaty 
of peace. In the last event the truce would be broken, and a 
state of active war would have been resumed. We would have 
had no cession of the sovereignty of the Philippines, and none 
of Puerto Rico, and no relinquishment of the sovereignty of 
Cuba. It is true that in the protocol of August 12th Spain liad 
definitely promised that she would cede Puerto Rico and relin- 
quish Cuba, but without a treaty of peace that promise would 
not be performed. What would then have been the exigence 
of the situation? Undoubtedly we would have been compelled 
to go on and seize with the strong hand, and l»y military i)0wer, 
both the Philippine archipelago and the Greater and Lesser 
Antilles, taking by ruthless conquest what it was far better 
that we should take by the voluntary cession of a treaty of 
peace. 

But now we have them it does not follow that we are com- 
mitted to a colonial policy or to a violation of those great prin- 
ciples of liberty and self-government which must always remain 
American ideals, if our own free institutions are to endure. "— 
(Speech before the Wilmington Board of Trade, January 15, 
1899.) 
All of these latter results Aguiualdo has so far thwarted ; ^^A^umaM^^^^^^ 
his personal ambition overcame all consideration for the '''^»^:'m7- 
inhabitants of the Philippines; he was not willing to wait 
until the United States had instituted a free and liberal 
provisional government under the care of the Congress of 
the United States and under the surveillance of tiie whole 
American people; but he cruelly rushed into a bloody 
and unnecessary war without the slightest fact to sustain 
him, either in morals, contract (express or implied), or in 



United State.s 
CJoveruinent. 



46 7'///-; ANTl-IMPKRIALISTS ANSWERED. 

the principles of international law. He was playing for a 
great stake — the government of the Filipinos. With the 
sux^port of the United States his game was won. Without 
it he was mined. The miserable adventurer, learning that 
there was a possible division of opinions on this subject in 
the United States, opened the war, relying upon a part of 
the American people to eventually uphold him in his ne- 
farious and bloody scheme. In a nutshell this is the whole 
truth of Aguinaldo's rebellion. 
'^\"aims*'^ Let us spend a moment in looking into the justice of 
analyzed. Aguiualdo's claims. It must be remembered that he estab- 
lished a dictatorial government. The United States had no 
evidence whatever that he represented the eight or ten 
millions of people in the Philippine Islands ; they had not 
been consulted, except so far as Aguinaldo had allured 
them with the seeming claim that he was acting in con- 
junction with the great power of the United States Govern- 
ment. Mr. Schurz and the Anti-Imperialists claim that we 
should have recognized the independence of the Filipinos. 
AVould that have been fair and honorable treatment of the 
inhabitants of the Philippines? 

" Q. Was the Congress fairly representative of the various 
provinces in the Philippine Archipelago, or chiefly made uj) of 
Luzon? 

A. Luzon exclusively. 

Q. In the Island of Luzon were the various provinces repre- 
sented, or mostly Tagalog ? 

A. All Tagalog." 

(2 Report of Philippine Com. , p. 387. ) 

Should we not have taken time to breathe — to investi- 
gate — to send our commissions and boards of enquiry to 
interrogate the people of these islands — to ascertain what 
their interests, wants and demands were? To have recog- 
nized their independence before we concluded a treaty 
with S])ain was absolutely repugnant to all the principles 
of iiitprnntioiial law, and of good common sense and pi'u- 
dence. To have done so afterward was possible and prob- 



Til E- A .\ Tl-I M PER 1 A LI S'l'S AA'SIVKKF.D. 47 

able, but Aguinaldo tliwarteid all this by rushing iulo war, 
instead of quietly and calmly and honoiably seeking to 
negotiate with this great Government iii)()n I he basis of 
mutual sympathy and friendship. 

And yet Mr. Schurz lays down the bold, l)are, uncondi- 
tional proposition and charge against the Administration 
" that if wc Iiad treated tlie Filipinos justly we should have 
recognized their independence." — (New York llcridd, Jidy 
14, 1900.) 

And he undertakes to support this upon the ground of 
moi'als, equity and justice! With great respect to Mr. 
Schurz's high intelligence and experience, I say that this 
is simply preposterous ; it is more than preposterous, it is 
humbug. 

I have shown that there was no express promise made 
to Aguinaldo, and that in face of the testimony of Dewey, 
Pratt and Wildman, in view of the clear and exact in- 
structions of our government, and all of the circumstances 
surrounding this insurrection, none can be implied. 



VII. 

There remains the single question of co-operation. Does ^)^^;;\|i;*^^'/?"f, 
that imply a recognition of independence? Does it Invotce '"^eSnUton''' 
recognition? Is there any code of morals or of law which 
says that, since we availed ourselves of the co-operation 
of the Filipinos under the circumstances disclosed, there 
is a lien upon our consciences and honor to proclaim the 
immediate independence of Aguinaldo's government? 

Now, let us meet Mr. Schurz upon this vaunted tield of 
morality, where he professes to love to graze, and again 
place the United States vis-a-vls to Aguinaldo. Why 
were we bound in morals to recognize him/ 

He was faithless to his trust in the insurrection of 180(3. 
He settled that war for a money consideration— for what 



48 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

the Anglo-Saxon race would call a bribe. When did he 
abandon the insurrection? At the very moment when the 
Spanish Government believed he was victorious — and to 
prevent his victory they bribed him and his crew by 
money ! 

How did he provide for his people in that treaty? By 
failing to reqidre the SpaiiisTi Government to exyressly 
agree in writing to redress their grievances. This — 
the material part of the insurrection — was left to oral 
promises, if stipulated for at all, while his banishment 
and the money he was to receive for submitting to it — 
the declaration of peace and the surrender of arms — were 
all carefully provided for by written instrument. Was 
he a man to whom the Government of this country could 
contide the interests, the w^elfare, the hai^piness, the 
liberty of from eight to ten millions of people? Recog- 
nize the independence of the Filipinos ! Who asked for 
it? No one but Aguinaldo. Mr. Schurz forgets that a 
third — the most material — the essential — party to this 
question were the people themselves. Recognize Agui- 
naldo without consulting the people? How impossible — 
how preposterous ! Read the testimony of the leading 
lawyers, business men, and others before the Philippine 
Commission, and learn with what unanimity they are 
opposed to immediate independence. 
Hear what the Commission say : 

" While the peoples of the Philii)pine Islands ardently desire 
a full measure of rights and liberties, they do not, in the 
opinion of the Commission, generally desire independence. 
Hundreds of witnesses testified on this subject to the Commis- 
sion and its individual members, and, though they represented 
all possible varieties of opinion — many of them in sympathy 
with the insurgents — they were uniform in their testimony — 
that in view of the ignorance and political inexperience of the 
masses of the people, the multiplicity of languages, the diver- 
gencies of culture and mode of life, and the obstacles to inter- 
communication, an iride])endent sovereign Philippine state was 
at the present time neither possible nor desirable, even if its 



THE ANTI-IMPERIAIJSTS AX^WERRP. \\\ 

poverty iuid iiitrnial wcukiu'ss iiiid luck ol' culu'rciKH- uouM 
not invito, and the dissatisfaction of aliens entail, tlic inter- 
vention of foreign powers, witli the inevitable result of the di- 
vision of the archipelago among theni and the disappearance 
forever of the dream and hope of a united and self-governing 
Philipi)ine Commonwealtli. The Philippine Islands, even the 
most patriotic declare, cannot at the present time stand alone." 
(Report of the Philippine Com., Vol. 1, p. 82.) 

Of whom was this Commission composed? Jacob Gould 
SchuniKUi, of New York, President of Cornell University ; 
Rear Admiral George Dewej^ ; Charles Deuby, of Indiana, 
Ex-Minister to China ; Prof. Dean C. Worcester, of Mich- 
igan University ; and General Otis. Not politicians, but 
men taken from the best and most cultured walks of 
American life, who patiently and carefully investigated 
every feature of the insurrection, and whose report is a 
model of fulness, precision, fairness and strength. 

Even Aguinaldo, as late as June 16, 1898, informed our 
Consul at Manilla 

" that his friends all hoped the Philippines would be held as a 
colony of the United States of America." (Senate Doc. No. 
63, Part I., o5th Cong., 31st Sess., p. 329.) 

The Belgian Consitl, Andre, on August 29, 1898, wrote: 
"If the United States does not take these islands under 
their protection the country Avill be utterly ruined and all 
foreign merchants wall leave the islands." {Ibid., p. 386.) 

And General Greene reported : 

" In the next place Aguinaldo's goveniment or any entirely 

independent government does not command the hearty support 

of the large body of the Filipinos * * * they fully realize 

that they must have the support of some strong nation for 

many years before they will be in a position to manage their 

own affairs alone." {Ibid., p. 424.) 

Shall we accept these conclusions of these men who 

have been upon the spot, and of this Commission who, 

under the solemnity of their oaths and with their positions 



50 



THE ANT/./A/PERlAL/STS ANSWERED. 



and rei)utation at stake, report tliat the immediate inde- 
pendence of the Filipinos would be bad and disadvan- 
tageous to the people and in every way chimerical? Or, 
shall we accept Carl Schiirz, and his Anti-Imperialists— 
without facts, law or morals to justify them? 
The position of The real situation of the insur^^ents to the United 

the United Oi. i i • i 

States towards btates has been entirely overlooked or misunderstood bv 

the Fihpinos. " »' 

the Anti- Imperialists. The United States Government 
was at war with Spain, and availed itself of every aid 
which might be found to attain success. One of the 
principal methods of w^arfare in an enemy's country is to 
sow discontent among the people, and to utilize it either 
by arming the malcontents or using them in any other 
way. Dewey was perfectly justified in resorting to this 
method, and of availing himself of Aguinaldo to fan into 
life the fires of an insurrection which were fast smoulder- 
ing out. Without Dewey — without the army of the 
United States — Aguinaldo was nothing; with their co- 
operation he was able to draw around him an army of in- 
surgents. This he shrewdly but dishonestly used to claim 
rights to which he was not entitled — which had been re- 
jected, and which were not supported by the people of the 
Philippine Islands. 



"Benevolent 
Assimilation" 
Proclamation 
of December 
19, 1898, con- 
sidered. 



VIII. 

The Anti- Imperialists find fault with the President for 
issuing a proclamation on December 19, 1898, before the 
Treaty of Peace had been ratified by the United States 
Senate. This is the principal assault which they make 
upon the Executive — the piece de resistance of their 
charges and calumnies. It is well to examine it in this 
connection. 

Mr. Schurz says : 

"Was it his 'duty' to issue that famous 'benevolent 
assimilation ' order, by whicli u^eehs before the ratification of 



THE AXTI-IMPERlAl.lsrS AXSWENED. 51 

the peace treaty gave him a legal right to Jo .so, /if dirvrtvil nn 
army to enforce tJiroiighont the arrhipilago Anurirnn Soiwr- 
eignty, which tlien did not even technically exist?" (N. Y. 
Herald, July 14, 1900.) 

" Was it his ' duty ' thus substantially to declare war against 
the Philippine Islanders striving for their freedom and inde- 
pendence, and to do this in terms so inflammatory tiiat General 
Otis found himself obliged to substitute for the President's 
order a |)roclamation of his own?'' [Ihld.) 

" Was it the President's 'duty' thus directly to provoke 
an armed conflict with the Filipinos? This was not only not 
the President's ' duty,' but it was a wanton and ruthless insult 
thrown in the face of the people who had acted as our allies 
against a ' common enemy,' and who aspired to be free, and it 
was at the same time a barefaced usurpation of power whicli 
only an unscrupulous partisan spirit would overlook or excuse. " 
{Ibid.) 

The facts in connection with this are as follows : 
The protocol of peace between the United States and 
Spain was entered into on the 12th of An^^ust, 1898. It 
laid the foundation for the subsequent treaty. By article 
third of this document it was provided tliat the United 
States was to 

"occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila peiid- 
ing the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine 
the control, disposition and government of the Philii)pines." 

The treaty, signed by the Spanish and American Com 
missioners at Paris on the 10th of December, 1898, pro- 
vided that " Spain cedes to the United States the Archi- 
pelago known as the Philippine Islands." 

The treaty was ratified by the Senate of the United 
States OQ the 6th day of February, 1899. Between the 
making of this treaty on the 10th day of December, 1898, 
and its ratification by the Senate on the 6th day of 
February, 1899, the President issued a proclamation to 
the Filipinos, which is now known as ihn "benevolent 
assimilation" proclanuition, and vviiich is assailed on the 



5> THE ANT]. IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

ground that until the treaty loas ratified the PresidenVs 
act in claiming sonereignty over tJiese islands loas pre- 
mature and illegal. This point is as narrow and technical 
a one as was ever raised in a justice's court to defeat a 
meritorious claim by resort to a small technical defense. 

Happily, it has no foundation even technically, and it 
is absolutely unsustainable under the Constitution. 

The President's instructions were issued on the 21st of 
December, 1898, and were in substance as follows : 

" The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of 
Manila by the United States naval squadron, commanded by 
Rear Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the City 
and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically effected 
the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of 
Spanish sovereignty therein. 

With the signature of the treaty of peace between the 
United States and Spain by their respective plenipotentiaries 
at Paris on the 10th inst. , and as the result of the victories of 
American arms, the future control, disposition and govern- 
ment of the Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States. 
In fulfilment of the rights of sovereignty thus acquired and 
tiie responsible obligations of government thus assumed, the 
actual occupation and administration of the entire group of 
tha Philippine Islands become immediately necessary, and the 
military government heretofore maintained by the United 
States in the city, harbor and bay of Manila is to be extended 
with all possible dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory. 
In performing this duty the military commander of the 
United States is enjoined to make known to the inhabitants of 
the Philippine Islands that in succeeding to the sovereignty of 
Spain, in severing the former ])olitical relations of the inhabit- 
ants, and in establishing a new political power, the authority of 
the United States is to be exerted for the security of the per- 
sons and property of the people of the Islands and for the 
confirmation of all their private rights and relations. It will 
be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to 
announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we 
come not as invaders or conquerers, but as friends, to protect 



THE ANTf-IMPERIAUSTS A XSW Eh' I: H. 53 

the natives in their homes, in tht'ir t'm|)l()yriients .ind iti their 
personal and religious riglits. All persons who, cither li\- 
active aid or by honest submission, co-operate witli the (iov- 
ernment of the United States to give effect to these beneficent 
purposes, will receive the reward of its support and protection. 
All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have 
assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity so far 
as may be possible. * * * 

It should be the earnest and paramount aim of the militarv 
administration to win the confidence, respect and affection of 
the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring to them in every 
possible way that full measure of individual rights and liber- 
ties which is the heritage of free peoples, and by proving to 
thera that the mission of the United States is one of benevo- 
lent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and 
right for arbitrar}^ rule. In the fulfilment of this high mission, 
supporting the temperate administration of affairs for the 
greatest good of the governed, there must be sedulously main- 
tained the strong arm of authority, to repress disturbance and 
to overcome all obstacles to the bestowal of the blessings of 
good and stable government npon the people of the Philijipine 
Islands under the free fiag of the United States." (Cong. Kec., 
55th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 2515.) 

This proclamation — as it is called — was in effect in- 
structions issued by the President as Commander-in-Chief, 
through the Secretary of War to the General in command 
at the Philippines. Great stress is laid by Mr. Scliurz upon 
the fact that the General, in making his proclamation, did 
not use the exact language of the President. Here is 
another instance of the utter recklessness of these critics — 
another evidence that their whole stock-in-trade consists 
of endeavoring to pick to pieces the acts of the President 
by a resort to miserable cavils and paltry criticisms. The 
language of the President was the mere basis for a [)r()c- 
lamation. It furnished the substance to the General in 
command. He was on the spot and could know what 
language was best to be used. In substance he ad()})ted 
every idea and thought of the President. The claim of 



54 THE A N T/-IMPEK/A I. IS TS A .VS WERED. 

sovereignty was as clear in the proclamation as it was in 
the instructions of the President. The inhabitants could 
not fail to understand from both that the United States 
was the conqueror and owner of the islands. 

The other claim is that until the treaty was ratified 
by the Senate the President was paralyzed — that nothing 
could be done bj^ him with reference to these islands — 
that everything was in statu quo, without authority on his 
part to move an inch until the Senate acted on the treaty. 
These agitators forget, or they conceal the fact, that this 
proclamation of December 19, 1898, was but a repetition 
of the proclamation of May 19, 1898, to which I have 
referred. The sovereignty of the United States was therein 
expressly claimed by right of conquest on May 19, 1898, 
because it was an inevitable, foreseen result, as plain as 
the coming of any fixed event, that these islands would 
fall into our hands. 

The protocol had been signed on August 12. On August 
18 Manila was taken, and December 10, 1898, the treaty 
formally ceded the Philippines to us. But this cession 
was not in the nature of an original grant — it was a con- 
firmation of an existing title by conquest. 

The President did not assume to issue these proclama- 
tions as President of the United States — they were issued 
under Sec. 2 of Article II. of the Constitution of the 
United States, which declares 

" The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the sev- 
eral States wlien called into the actual service of the United 
States." 

During the war, and until a definitive treaty was rati- 
fied by Spain and the Senate, the President's power as 
Commander -in-Chief was supreme. In war the power of 
the President as Commander-in Chief was almost arbitrary ; 
in 'peace he acted in conjunction with the Senate. 

Between the signing of tlie protocol and the definitive 



Tffl-: AXTI-TMrERlAUSTS A X S\V l-.R FD. r>,"; 

ratification oi" the tieaty by the Senate, th.- I'lvsident's 
power as Commander in -Chief was in full vif^or and force, 
and coupling this with the other facts, and with the agreed 
treaty of December 10, 1898, the President's proclamation 
was perfectly proper and legal. He had the undoubted 
right to prepare the minds of the Filipinos for the inevit- 
able future. 

On May 19, 1898, as Commander-in-Chief, he issued 
his original proclamation through the Secretary of War, 
defining the rights and duties of the inhabitants of these 
islands. Is there any doubt of his complete right to do 
this? If there is I refer to the decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court : 

" The powers of the President are defined in the 2nd article 
of the Constitution. It was decided by the Supreme Court 
of the U. S. in reference to the Mexican War that in the con- 
quest of a country the President may establish a provisional 
government which may ordain laws and institute a judicial 
system which will continue in force after the war and until 
modified by the direct legislation of Congress or by the terri- 
torial government established by its authority. " 

(Laurence's Wheaton on International Law, 2nd Anno. 

Ed., p. 99, note 39, citing: 
Fleming vs. Page, 9 How., 615. 
Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How., 190. 
Liebensdorfer vs. Webb, 20 How., 177.) 

In the case of Cross et al. vs. Harrison, 1(5 IIow., U. S. 
Rep., 189, Judge Wayne, in delivering the opinion of tlie 

Court, said : 

* * * " Early in 1847 the President, as constitutional 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, authorized the 
military and naval Commanders of our forces in California to 
exercise the belligerent rights of a conqueror and to form a 
civil government for the conquered country, and to impose 
duties on imports and tonnage as military contributions for 
the support of the government and of the army which had the 
conquest in possession. No one can doubt that these orders 



56 TFIF. AN TI-IMPEK/A LISTS ANSWERED. 

of the President and the action of our Army and Navy Com- 
manders in California in conformity with them were accord- 
ing to the law of arms." 

And in Sir Sherston Baker's First Steps in International 
Law (p. 360, § 16) it is stated : 

That "the President of the United States can make no 
treaty without the concurrence of two thirds of the Senate, 
and his authority over ceded conquered territory, though 
derived from the law of nations, is subordinate to Congress. 
But. as a constitutional Commander-in-Chief, he is authorized 
to form a civil or military government for the conquered terri- 
tory during the war, and when such territory is ceded to the 
United States, as a conquest, the existing government, so 
established, does not cease as a matter of course or as a con- 
sequence of the restoration of peace." 

It wns not necessary for the Commander-in-Chief of our 
Army and Navy to wait until the treaty was actually rati- 
fied by the Senate. He had conquered the Philippines. 
After the 21st of December, 1898, Spain would never 
have lifted her hand against the victorious progress of our 
troops. Spain had fought for the Philippines through 
her Commissioners at Paris, and had finally agreed to 
cede them to the United States. The United States would 
have been guilty of perfidy to the Filipinos if it had 
allowed these islands to go back to Spain. What law or 
provision of the Constitution prevented Mr. McKinley 
from making his proclamation ? Assumption is neither 
proof nor argument. Why should he wait ? Could he 
not act in anticipation ? Could he not assume that the 
Senate would in all honor and decency — to say nothing of 
the merits— confirm the deliberations of an independent 
Commission composed of Americans and Spaniards ? And 
wlien it should be confirmed by a sort of jus postlimini 
it retroacted to the date of its original adoption, and its 
confirmation reacted back and ratified all of the acts of 



THE AXTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. •)" 

the President us Commander-in-Chiet'. The fac-i ol' its 
conlirniatioii by the Senate silences all objt^ctions. 

It is urged that Aiueriean sovereignty did not exist at 
this time. But it did, and the proclamation of May 11), 
1898, seven months previously, had claimed its existence 
by conquest. 

Read the commencement of the proclamation of Decem- 
ber 21st and it is seen that it does not rest upon the treaty 
alone. It asserts that : 

"The destruction of the Spanish Heet in the h:u-l)or of 
Manila by the United States naval squadron, coniinanded Ijy 
Rear Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city 
and the surrender of the Spanish forces, practically ejfected the 
conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of 
Spanish sovereignty.'''' 

But it is further claimed that its language was so injlam- 
matory W\^t General Otis suppressed some of the language- 
and substituted a proclamation of his own ! The inflam- 
mation is in the criticism and not in the proclamation. Its 
language is temperate, fair, clear and firm. It is such an 
accurate reproduction of the principles of international law, 
acquiesced in everywhere, that, as I said before, it might 
have been copied from a law book on the subject involved. 
General Otis had his own reasons for changing the lan- 
guage of the President. That circamstance is of no 
moment. The proclamation can stand on its own bottom. 
It is also claimed that this proclamation was substantially 
a declaration of war against the Filipinos. If this is so 
the war was declared long before by the proclamation of 
May 19, 1898. But let ns go deeper into this wonderful 
point of the Anti-Imperialists. Suppose the treaty had 
not been ratified. War would then have existed between 
the United States and Spain. Was the President, then, 
not right in claiming sovereignty over these possessions, 
the property of Spain? But the treaty was ratified — and 



58 



THE A N Tl-IMPF.RIA /, IS TS A NS IVERED. 



Mr. Bryan 
indorsed and 
supported the 
treaty between 
Spain and the 
United States. 



ratitied throngli the conceded intinence of Mr. Bryan. 

Hear what this Arch Anti-Imperialist now admits : 

" When the President linall)' laid before the Senate a treaty 
whicli * * * provided for tlie cession of the Philii)])ine 
Islands, the menace of Imperialism became so apparent that 
many preferred to reject the treaty and risk the ills that might 
follow, rather than take tlie chance of correcting the errors of 
the treaty by the independent action of this country. 

I was among the number of those Avho believed it better to 
ratify the treaty and end the war, release the volunteers, 
remove the excuse for war expenditures, and then give to the 
Filipinos the independence which might be forced from Spain 
by a new treaty. In view of the criticism which my action 
aroused in some quarters, I take this occasion to restate the 
reasons given at that time. I thought it safer to trust the 
American people to give independence to the Filipinos than to 
trust the accomplishment of that purpose to diplomacy with an 
unfriendly nation. * * * j believe that we are now iti a 
better position to wage a successful contest against Imperialism 
than we would have been had the treaty been rejected. With 
the treaty ratified a clean-cut issue is presented between a gov- 
ernment by consent and a government by force. If the treaty 
had been rejected the opponents of Imperialism would have 
been held responsible for any international complications which 
might have arisen before the ratification of another treaty. 
* * * The title of Spain being extinguisJied we 'were at lib- 
erty to deal 'with the Filijjvnos according to American princi- 
ples. " (Mr. Bryan's letter of acceptance.) 

Here is a distinct admission that Spain had a title to 
cede. It completely upsets a favorite argument of the 
Anti-Imperialists that Spain had no title to the Philip- 
pines at the date of the treaty. 

To upliold or sustain the consistency of this admission 
with other declarations in this remarkable letter of 
acceptance is fortunately not a nut for me to crack. The 
cliildren of Israel had a hard time to make bricks without 
straw, but their task was easy when compared to tliat 



rilE ANTI-IMrEKIAIJSrs AXSWI-.KIil). 50 

which Mr. Bryan has put upon his foHowers— to reconcile 
the sentences of that letter. One marked difTerence l)e- 
tween Mr. Bryan and Mr. Schurz is that tlie fortiici- is 
willing- to trust the future of the Pliilii)i)ines in the iinnds 
of the American people, where Mr. McKinley lias sulci y 
placed it, while Mr. Schurz loudly clamors for an iiimie- 
diate recognition of their independence. 

When Anti-Imperialists fall out the Filipinos will get 
their dues. 

Supposing, for argument's sake, the Piesident did act 
prematurely. What follows? He committed no offense — 
invaded none of the provisions of the Constitution or of 
the treaty. He simply took time by the forelock iind 
opened up the way to a smooth and friendly relationshi}) 
with the Filipinos. 

He was guardian of the interests of the Filipinos until, by 
the terms of the treaty. Congress acted. It was with this 
body, under the Constitution of the United States, and 
under the express provisions of the treaty, that the whole 
question of the rights, government and future of the Fili- 
X)inos was confided. Until it acted the matter was in the 
hands of the President in the double capacity of Execu- 
tive of the nation and of Commander in Chief of the Army 
and Navy. Even if he were technicall}'^ wrong, which 
I emphatically deny, there was a mere question of good 
taste involved. Good manners demand that the President 
of the United States should be free from criticism when 
acting in the performance of his duties as Executive, if 
he is not violating any law. The President under the 
Constitution has a certain scope and liberty of action. 
Within this sphere, if a part of the nation does not agree 
with him, good taste, gentle breeding and i)oliteness re- 
quire silence. We may not agree with him in his method 
of living, his dress, his religion ; but he has been selected 
as Chief of the nation by the people. He needs to be re- 
spected. In the present instance Mr. McKinley conscien- 



60 THE ANl'I-IiMPEKIALISTS ANSWERED. 

tiously believed he was acting for the true interests and 
real welfare of the Filipinos. Every step he took was the 
result of much care and thought. He was, for the first 
time in the history of this country, confronted with an en- 
tirely new problem — thrust upon him by the unexpected 
occurrences at Manila. It was a situation that required 
study, and as long as he was acting in good faith and for 
the interests of the whole people — which nothing but a 
brazen mendacity can deny — he should have been sup- 
ported by everybody, because there was no question of 
politics involved. His action has been fully conlirnied by 
the Senate. The intemperate and inflammatory criticism of 
him by the Anti-Imperialists has, then, no foundation in 
j)rinciples of morality or law — they have simply invaded 
the domain of good breeding and manners, and beliaved 
with disrespect toward the Executive of this great nation. 
If they need to be enlightened about the real merits of 
this question they should have studied the facts and 
records. 

As for their bad manners, I cannot undertake to correct 
them. I simply point out to them that the office of the 
President of the United States — no matter by whom it is 
administered — whether by Mr. McKinley or Mr. Cleve- 
land, whether by a Republican or Democrat — is entitled 
to respect. The occupant should in the domain of his dis- 
cretion be free from calumnious, slanderous or libellous 
criticism. And the men who indulge in such ungentle- 
manly pastimes should be held up in the pillory of public 
execration. 

I take in this connection an episode in the life of 
Jefferson — whose isolated words the A nti- Imperialists are 
never tired of quoting. In the acquisition of the territory 
of Louisiana, Mr. Jefferson saw a great opportunity to 
benefit the people of the United States. Its purchase 
could not be postponed, and yet between its acquisition 
and his constitutional opinions there stood a formidable 



THE ANri-lMri:l<lAl.lSl-S A .VSll'/.h'/-: D. 01 

barrier. lie hud lionest tloubts uliether any Icniloiy 

could be acquired by tlie United States without an a iid 

merit to the Constitution, but lie saw that if Ik* did not 
avail himself of the opportunity quickly and prcjinpLly 
the occasion would be lost. He took the territory. Let 
Mr. Tucker, his biographer, tell the rest of the story : 

" He had good reasons for this caution as it respected France, 
since the American ministers at Paris soon afterwards wrote 
that if the negotiation were then to take place, the same treaty 
could not be obtained, and that if the United States gave the 
F'rench Government the least opening they could declare it 
void ; and that a ' warning ' to this effect had been given to 
them ; and moreover a strange letter relative to the treaty had 
been recently written by their minister (Pichon) to our Sec- 
retary of State. In communicating the preceding facts to 
Colonel Wilson C. Nicholas, then residing in Albemarle, Mr. 
Jefferson again expresses his opinion that they could not in- 
corporate Louisiana with the United States Avithout an amend- 
ment to the constitution ; but Colonel Nicholas had expressed 
the opinion that the power given to Congress to admit new- 
States into the Union extended to territory beyond their limits 
at that period. 

It clearly appears by the same letter that Mr. Jefferson did 
not think that the constitution authorized this addition to the 
national territory and that it would be necessary to obtain a 
special amendment for that purpose. 

'The Constitution,' he remarks in the same letter, 'has 
made no provision for our holding foreign territory, still less 
for incoi'porating foreign nations into our Union. The exec- 
utive, in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so much ad- 
vances the good of their country, have done an art bei/ofid 
the Constitution. The legislature in casting behind them meta- 
physical subtleties, and risking themselves like faithful ser- 
vants, must ratify and pay for it, and throw themselves on their 
country, for doing for them unauthorized, what we know they 
would have done for themselves, had they been in a situation 
to do it.' He assimilates the case to that of a guardian who 
exceeds his authority to make an advantageous purchase for 



62 



THE A N ri- IMPERIA LIS TS A NS WE RED. 



Ins ward, relying on his confirming it when he comes of age, 
and adds, ' But we sliall not be disowMied by the nation, and 
their act of indemnity will confirm and not weaken the Con- 
stitution by more strongly marking out its lines, ' " (Life of 
Jefferson, by Tucker, Vol. 2, p. 147.) 

No constitutional amendment was ever passed, and Mr. 
Jefferson's views have since been shown to be unfounded 
bj^ historical precedent, and judicial authority. But no 
act throws more glory upon his political career than his 
endeavor to save this great body of land for this country 
at the sacrifice of his own opinions. Let the Anti-Impe- 
rialists draw a lesson from tliis— at least of good manners. 
But I must not fail to notice in this connection another 
proposition of the Anti-Imperialists, viz. : that by issuing 
the i3roclamation of December 21, 1898, the President 

" substantially declared war against the Philippine Islanders 
striving for their freedom and independence." (New York 
Herald, July 14, 1900.) 

and the question they put in connection with it 

"Was it the President's 'duty ' thus directly to provoke an 
armed conflict with the P'ilipinos? " 

and the answer which they make to their own question, 
that the act of the President was 

"a barefaced usurpation of power which only an unscrupulous 
partisan spirit would overlook or excuse." {Ibid.) 

' I have shown that Aguinaldo determined as early as May 
j J 4tli,1898,to wage war against the United States if his dictii- 
y torial government was not recognized (ante, p. 18 et seq.). 
I have shown by the correspondence between himself and 
Generals Anderson, Merrirt and Otis that he was waitino- 
every opportunity to put this purpose into execution 
(ante, p. 31 et seq.). I have shown that as early as May 19, 
1898, the United States had claimed the sovereignty of 
these islands by conquest (ante, p. 22 et seq.). I have endeav- 
ored to show that in the exercise of his power as Com- 



rilE A XT/-/.]/ r/- A' /A LISTS A A' S 11' /:/,/: /\ 03 

mander in Chief of the Army and Navy the President was 
justified in issuing the prochiniation of December 21, 1898 
(ante, p. 50 et seq.). I have shown that Agiiinahlo did not 
represent the people of the Philippine Islands (ante, 
p. M et seq.) or their sentiments (ante, p. 46). 

I will add but one word more. I will bring notice 
home so directly that no one can deny it. Negotiations 
took place in January, 1899, between Commissioners of 
Aguinaldo and officers api)ointed by General Otis. 

" Witli great tact and patience the Commanding General 
had held liis forces in cheek, and he now made a final effort to 
preserve the peace by appointing a Commission to meet a sim- 
ilar body appointed by Aguinaldo and to ' confer with regard 
to the situation of affairs and to arrive at a mutual understand- 
ing of the intents, purposes, aims and desires of tlie Fili- 
pinon people and of the people of the United States.' Six 
sessions were held, the last occurring on January 29, 1899, six 
days before the outbreak of hostilities. No substantial results 
were obtained, the Filipino Commissioners being either unable 
or unwilling to give an}^ definite statements of the ' intent, 
purposes, and aims of the people.' At the close of the last 
session they were given full assurances that no hostile act would 
be inaugurated by the United States troops." (Vol. I., Rep. 
Philippine Commission, p. 175.) 

The proclamation of December 21, 1898, is used as a 
mere pretext to embarrass the question. It was in no 
sense a declaration of war, nor was it so regarded by 
Aguinaldo. It is an afterthought on the part of the xVnti- 
Imperialists lo call it such. Aguinaldo knew the position 
of the United States /ro??i the beginning. He was plainly 
and clearly notified that his pretended military or civil 
power wonld never be recognized. He was not consulted 
as to the terms of the treaty, because he was in no proper 
sense an "ally " of the United States— he was for a short 
time an auxiliary— precisely as an additional indigenous 
regiment or regiments would be. His whole capital con- 
sisted of the moral force of the United States. 



64 THE ANl^I-lMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

Aguinaldo was not an "ally," for the additional and 
weighty reason that he was never consulted by and never 
directly co-operated with oui' forces — not in one single in- 
stance. Between June and August 13, 1898, when Manila 
was captured, he ran a campaign of his own, inducing 
the Filipino militia to desert the Spanish army with 
their guns and ammunition, and fighting desultory 
bands of Spanish soldiers. All of his successes were at- 
ti'ibutable to the moral force of the United States. He 
guarded the land side of Manila, it is true, but Manila 
was ours without him or his aid. His whole campaign, 
the augmentation of his forces, and keeping them together, 
was to fight the United States. Until hostilities actually 
begun, on the eve of the ratification of the treaty by the 
United States— February 6th, 1899— Aguinaldo skulked 
around the outposts of the United States Army. It was 
with the greatest difliculty our generals and officers could 
reach him. This ''ally'' of ours never condescended to 
have a personal interview with either Generals Anderson, 
Merritt or Otis ! 

Long before the Senate ratified the treaty he had con- 
cluded to attack Manila, for a few days before hostilities 
began Aguinaldo secretly ordered the Filipinos who were 
friendly to him to seek refuge outside the city. (Vol. I., 
Report Philippine Commission, p. 174.) 

And after the war began the Administration held out 
the olive branch to these insurgents. A Connnission was 
appointed, one of whose objects was "to assist in the 
peaceful extension of American authority and the estab- 
lishment of civil and peaceful government among the 
people." This Commission issued a proclamation ex- 
pressing these views, and had several conferences with 
Aguinaldo's Commissioners — they tried to see him per- 
sonally, but all of their efforts for agreement and peace 
were ineffectual. 



THE A A' 77- IMPRRrA f. IS TS A XS 11 'EA'/-:/). 



(;5 



This is in brief the history of this rel)elli()ti agaiiisi the 
sovereignty of the United States by the Filipinos. 

It was an unnecessaiy, cruel, preineditatrd, criniiiial 
war, inaugurated and carried on by Aguinaldo against the 
best friends of his country. 

The parties responsible for it are two, Aguinaldo :iiid 
his sympathizers in the United States — the so-called Anti- 
Imperialists. Without the latter the war would never 
have been commenced. With their aid it has been kept 
alive. The responsibility upon them is as great as that 
which men have ever shouldered in any i)ublic crisis. 
They can never shake it off. 



IX. 

Heretofore I have endeavored to fully answer all of the 
charges made by Mr. Schurz and the Anti Imperialists. If 
there are any which I have not expressly alluded to it is 
not because they have been overlooked, but because they 
are insignificant or are answered by some general state- 
ment of law or of fact. Out of these undisputed or con- 
ceded facts there flow certain consequences, based on priu- 
cij)les of international law. 

1. At the commencement of the war, and at the time 
of the defeat of the Spanish fleet at Manila, Spain was 
the supreme and sovereign authority in the Philippines. 
She did not, and could not, make any disposition of them 
after the war began, which would have interfered with the 
American right of conquest. Spain having been van- 
quished, gave up these possessions to the conqueror, the 
United States. They thus became the property of the 
United States by a double title— that of conquest and 
cession. 

2. As to the inhabitants of these islands, it made no 
difference whether they were many or few. They passed 
with the islands— they followed the conquest or cession. 



Legal conse- 
quences flow- 
ing from the 
eiiii<|ue-st of 
Pliilippiues. 



66 THE ANri-I^fPF.RrALISTS ANSWER ED. 

Innumerable historical instances of the correctness of 
this proposition are found in this country and elsewhere. 
If any one doubts this assertion let him study the cir- 
cumstances surrounding the purchase of Louisiana, Flor- 
ida, Alaska — let him study the history of California, New 
Mexico and Texas. 

One of the most striking and cruel illustrations of this 
principle of international law I will cite for the benefit of 
Mr. Carl Schurz — that of the forcible wrenching of Alsace 
and Lorraine from the sovereignty of France by Germany, 
his native land. The people of these two provinces were 
forced to become subjects of Germany, or to expatriate 
themselves and to give up their homes, birthplace, and all 
of those sacred and tender ties which attached them to 
their native land. I believe if it were put to a vote to-day 
the inhabitants of Alsace would overwhelmingly vote to 
become French subjects again; but they, in their own 
native land, are held down by force of conquest and cession. 
To those Anti-Imperialists overflowing with a lachrymose 
philanthropy and of the eternal principles of liberty, as 
they call them, I point to Alsace and Lorraine. Over this 
sad event they can shed all of their crocodile tears. 

But international law sanctioned the conduct of the 
Germans. When, therefore, Mr. Schurz and his associates 
talk of transferring bodies of people like sheep — e7i bloc — 
they entirely overlook the clear precepts of international 
law as laid down by every writer, and the necessary results 
of conquest or cession of territory. 

Here are some excerpts which establish the doctrine : 
" Tlie conqueror vvlio acquires a province or town from the 
enemy, acquires tliereby the same rights which were possessed 
by the State from whicli it is taken. If it formed a constituent 
part of the hostile State, and was fully and completely under 
its dominion, it j)asses into tiie power of tlie conqueror upon 
the same footing. It is united with the new State upon the 



THE ANTJ-IM I'ERlAl.lsrs A X S\V ER l-J). T,? 

same tenns on wiiicli il belongcMl to tlu- old one; tli;it is, with 
only such political rights as the constitution and laws of tlie 
new Satto may see fit to give it. It retains no political privi- 
leges or immunities, but may acquire those it never possessed 
before. In political rights it may be the gainer or the loser 
by the change; if from being a part of an absolute monarchy 
it becomes a part of a republic, its liberties will be enlarged, 
or, if the reverse, they will be restricted. But such restric- 
tion, in any case, must be in conformity with the rights of 
conquest and the laws of war. When New Mexico formed a 
part of the Mexican Republic, it enjoyed the right of repre- 
sentation in the Mexican Congress; on the conquest of that 
territory by the arms of the United States, under Gen. Kearny, 
a clause was introduced into the new organic la^v for sending 
a representative to the Congress of the United States. This 
))art of the organic law was disapproved by the President, 
and, even without such disapproval, it was utterly inoperative, 
for this right of representation was a political right, which 
was lost by the very act of conquest, and could be restored to 
it only by the action of Congress, after its permanent incor- 
poration into the conquering republic. The case, however, is 
different where the enemy possessed only a quasi-sovereignty, 
or limited political rights, over the conquered province or 
town. The conqueror acquires no other rights than such as 
belonged to the State against which he has taken up arms. 
' War,' says Vattel, ' authorizes him to possess himself of what 
belongs to his enemy. If he deprives that enemy of the 
sovereignty of a town or province, he acquires it, such as it is, 
with all its limitations and modifications. Accordingly, care 
is usually taken to stipulate, both in particular capitulations 
and in treaties of peace, that the towns and countries ceded 
shall retain all their liberties, privileges and immunities. But 
where such conquered provinces and towns have themselves 
taken up arms against him, thus making themselves directly 
his enemies, the conqueror may regard them as vanquished 
foes and treat them precisely as he would treat other con- 
quered territory.' " 

{Ilalleck's International Laic [Baker's Ed.], Vol. 2, page 
4r8'^, Sec. 2; citing Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. R., liU; 



68 THE AiYTl-IMPERlALISTS ANSWERED. 

American Ins, Co. ti. Canter, 1 Peters R., 542; Marcy to 
Kearny, Jan. 11, 1847, Ex. Doc, No. 17, 31st Cong., 1st 
Sess. H. R. 

" Where a conquest is confirmed, or in any other way made 
com})lete, the allegiance of the inhabitants who remain in the 
conquered territory is transferred to the new sovereign. The 
same effect is produced by an ordinary cession of such terri- 
tory. In either case the national character of the inhabitants 
who remain is deemed to be changed from that of the former 
to the new sovereign, and in their relations with other nations 
they are entitled to all the advantages, and are subject to all 
the disadvantages, of their new international status." 

(Sir Sherston Baker's First Steps in International Law, p. 
153, Sect. 30.) 

3. The inhabitants of a conquered or ceded conntry, 
if they do not agree or sympathize v^ith the form of gov- 
ernment of the conqueror, or purchaser or cessionee, can 
quit it; they have the admitted riglit of expatriation. 
This is generally provided for by treaty, but in the absence 
of express agreement the right to expatriate still exists. 

It was not provided for in the treaty between Spain and 
the United States. No one ever imagined, until an un- 
founded agitation arose in the United States, that the 
Filipinos would not have been amply satished with any 
temporary provisional and eventually permanent govern- 
ment which the United States would establish. 

But the right of expatriation is still open to them. 

" If the inhabitants of the ceded territory remain in 
the territory after such transfer, they are deemed to have 
elected to become subjects and thus have consented to the 
transfer of their allegiance to the new sovereignty. If they 
leave sine anitno revertendl, they are deemed to have elected 
to continue aliens to the new sovereignty. The status of the 
inhabitants of the conquered and transferred territory is thus 
determined by their own acts. This rule is the most just, 
reasonable and convenient which could be adopted. It is 
reasonable on the part of the conqueror, who is entitled to 
know who become his subjects, and who prefer to continue 



Till-: a/V7'1-/.)//'/:k/.u.js7-s axsu-/-:u/:/) tiO 

aliens; it is very convenient for those wlio wish lo Ixcome 
the subjects of the new State; and it is not unjust toward 
those who determine not to become its subjects. Accordini^ 
to this rule, domicile, as understood and defined in public 
law, determines the question of transfer of alli-t^iauct', <>r 
rather is the rule of evidence by which that (piestion is to Ije 
decided. 

"This rule of evidence, with respect to the allegiance of 
the inhabitants of ceded conquered territory, may be incon- 
venient to those who do not become subjects of the new sov- 
ereignty, as it requires them to change their domicile; but it 
is necessary for the protection of the rights of those who elect 
to become subjects of the new Government, and especially 
necessary for determining the rights and duties of the Gov- 
ernment which acquires their allegiance and is bound to afford 
them its protection. It would not do to leave the status of the 
inhabitants of the acquired territory uncertain and undeter- 
mined, and to suffer a man's citizenship to continue an open 
question subject to be disputed by any person at any time, and 
to change with his own intentions and resolutions as might 
best suit his convenience or interest. Count Platen Halleniund 
was prime minister of Hanover at the time of the capitulation 
of its army to Prussia in 1866. Hanover was afterwards 
forcibly annexed to Prussia, but before the annexation Count 
Platen left Hanover in the suite of the ex-King who, by the 
terms of the capitulation, was allowed to choose his own resi- 
dence together with a suite of attendants. They took up their 
abode at Vienna, and, while there, Count Platen was sum- 
moned to appear before the Supreme Court in Jierlin on a 
charge of high treason, alleged to have been committed by him 
abroad " as a royal Prussian subject," after he had ceased to 
reside in Hanover. According to the law of Prussia only a 
Prussian subject can be prosecuted before a Prussian court f<»r 
an act of high treason committed abroad, and it was, there- 
fore, necessary to assume that Count Platen had become a 
Prussian subject in consequence of the annexation of Hanover 
by Prussia. He pleaded to the jurisdiction of the court on the 
ground that he had never become a Prussian subject. 'Hie 
court, however, overruled the plea and proceeded against the 



70 THE ANTI-IMrERlALISTS ANSWERED. 

Count i)t contmnaciam., sentencing him to penal servitude for 
fifteen years. It is submitted that the mere fact of con- 
quest, or forcible annexation, does not create the relations of 
sovereign and subject between the conqueror and the con- 
quered, but there must be either an express or tacit submission 
for the purpose, and in "tacit submission " would be included 
the remaining within the sphere of the power of the new 
dominion and fulfilling the duties of subjects; but it must be 
entirely left to the subjects of the subdued state whether they 
will acknowledge the new sovereign power or not. Conse- 
quently they are at liberty to emigrate; but if they remain 
the}'' thereby tacitly declare that they enter the new State and 
community. 

"This modern and more benign construction of the laws 
of nations, with respect to the allegiance of the inhabitants of 
conquered or ceded territory, avoids all questions of the right 
of the one State to transfer, and of the other to claim, the 
allegiance of subjects of neutral States who are naturalised or 
domiciled in the territory transferred by conquest or treaty. All 
are alike aliens to the new sovereignty, if they elect to continue 
so, and all become its subjects if it consents to receive them, 
and they, by remaining in the transferred territory, signify 
their election to become such." 

(Sir Sherston Baker's First Steps in International Law, 
pp. 356, 357, 358, Sections 7, 8, 9.) 

"Allegiance of the Population of the Conquered or Ceded 
Territory. — When territory changes hands, by cession or con- 
quest, the fact that allegiance is now based upon consent is 
usually recognized by the insertion of a clause in the treaty by 
which the conquest is completed or the session accomplished, 
permitting such of the inhabitants as desire to retain their 
former citizenship to dispose of their property and return to 
the state of their original allegiance. Individuals who decline 
to take advantage of this permission and elect to remain in the 
ceded territory are presumed to consent to the change in alle- 
giance which is involved in the conquest or cession. From 
the nature of the case, however, no formal guarantee of the 
allegiance of the population of territory thus transferred is 



THE AXri.IMPF.l^/AIJSTS A .\' S WE RE P. 71 

either Q;ivoii or ex])ecte(l. It is proper to say, also, tliat uliile 
till" iiiliabitants of conipu'rcd or ceded territory become vested 
with tlie rights of citizenship l)y the fact of coiKpiest or cession, 
in so far as other states are concerned, tlieir actual absorption 
into the body politic of the con(juerin<r state is a matter w liicli 
is regulated, not by international law, but by the constitution 
and laws of the state to which their allegiance has l>een 
transferred by conquest or cession. (IV. Calvo, sections 
24GG, 2469; Amer. Ins. Co. m. Canter, 1 Peter, o42; 
Heffter, section 131; 11 Halleck, pp. 489-4i)7; III. riiilli- 
more, sections 591-593; Hall, sections 205, 20(; ; Dana's 
Wheaton, section 346, note 169; 11 Halleck, pp. 485-489; 
United States vs. Repentigny, 5 Wallace, 260; 1 Wildman, 
p. 162; IV. Calvo, sections 2466-2477.) 'By a principle 
of international law, on a transfer of territory by one nation 
to another, the political relations between the inhabitants of 
the ceded country and the former government are changed and 
new ones arise between them and the new government. The 
manner in which this is to be effected is ordinarily the subject 
of treaty. The contracting parties have the right to contract 
to transfer and receive respectively the allegiance of all the 
native-born citizens; but the naturalized citizens, who owe alle- 
giance purely statutory, are, when released therefrom, remitted 
to their original status.' — (Tobin ?;s. Walkinshaw, 1 McAllister, 
186; Amer. Ins. Co. vs. Canter, 1 Peters, 542.) ' When New 
Mexico was conquered by the United States, it was only the 
allegiance of the people that was changed ; their relation to 
each other and their rights of property remained undisturbed.' 
(Leitensdorfer et al. ys. Webb, 20 Howard, 176.) 'On a con- 
quest by one nation of another, and the subsequent surrender 
of the soil and change of sovereignty, those of the former in- 
habitants who do not remain and become citizens of the 
victorious sovereign, but, on the contrary, adhere to their old 
allegiance and continue in the service of the vanquished sov- 
ereign, deprive themselves of protection or security to tlieir 
property, except so far as it may be secured by tn'at\'. ' — 
(United States vs. Repentigny, 5 Wallace, 211.) 'Hence, 
where, on such a conquest, a treaty provided that the former 
inhabitants who wished to adhere in allegiance to their van- 



72 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

qiiislied sovereign might sell their property, provided they sold 
it to a certain class of persons and within a time named, the 
property, if not so sold, became abandoned to the conqueror. ' — 
Ibid. " Citizens of territory acquired by the United States 
as a result of conquest or cession have the international priv- 
ileges of citizenship, in respect to extra territorial protection, 
etc., from the date of the treaty of peace or of cession. The 
matter of their citizenship or naturalization, as a question of 
municipal law, if not settled in the treaty, depends upon the 
legislation of Congress. The Treaty of Frankfort, in 1871, 
authorized liberty of emigration from the provinces of Alsace 
and Lorraine until October 1, 1872.'— (XIX. Nouv. Rec. Gen., 
p. G89; Hall, p. 572, note; III. Phillimore, pp. 868-871.)" 

(Davis' Elements of International Law, pp. 346-347, 
and note.) 

4. In all cessions or conquests of new territory, 
there is involved many great, delicate and important ques- 
tions concerning the fundamental rights of life, liberty 
and property. But these questions are necessarily in the 
hands of the conqueror or purchaser. If he is civilized, 
civilization will follow the new ownership. If he is a bar- 
barian and savage, God help the old inhabitants. They 
must flee their native land, or abide the behests of the new 
sovereign. Fortunately, in this age there are few cases 
which produce such an exxDerience. Alsace and Lorraine 
is the worst spectacle the world has seen for a long time. 
I5ut the rule of international law is unquestionable. To 
the victors belong the spoils. With a purchase of new 
territory is the accompanying right of dictating the form 
of the new government, subject always to the right of ex- 
patriation. 

If the conqueror or purchaser of new territory is civil- 
ized, just and sensible, he will not abuse his privileges. If 
lie is not he will make for his new subjects a luird life, and 
they in return will prevent him from enjoying a bed of 
roses. This is history — this is human nature. To read 
the utterances of some Anti-Imperialists one would think 



THE ANTI-JMPEKJALISTS AN SIVKRED. 73 

that the American nation was about to enshive the inhab- 
itants of the Pliilippine Ishmds, or to visit some condign 
punishment upon them. 

Does any sensible man think that such a fate awaits 
these people at our hands? 

Does not every one know that the future, the prosperity 
and happiness of the Filipinos will be promoted and en- 
hanced under the influences of any government which the 
Congress of the United States may impose? 

In each case of conquest or cession of territory there 
arises a new question as to how the inhabitants shall be 
treated and governed. The results are necessarily different 
in each instance. 

The inhabitants of the United States, as a general rule, 
need heavy overcoats, blankets, woolen clothing and rubber 
overshoes. I imagine that we will not force these necessary 
features of our physical life upon the Filipinos, any more 
than we will inflict them with governmental machinery 
which is inapplicable to their present political, educational 
and moral training and conceptions. 

Primarily all of these questions are matters to be care- 
fully discussed by the conqueror or purchaser ; the solution 
will be the result of observation, inquiry and study of the 
character, habits, history of the people — the climate, the 
jjresent and future interests of all concerned. We are not 
a nation of fools and idiots ; we are not a cruel and blood- 
thirsty race; we have sufficient intelligence, coui-age, civil- 
ization and Christianity to deal with any problem that 
comes before us in the natural development of our national 
life and history . 

A mother may with as much reason shrink from the re- 
sponsibility of rearing her first child because of the uovelty 
of the situation, as this nation should flee from meeting 
the responsibilities of any question born out of normal 
conditions. 

The Philippine Islands are ours — they will remain so — to 



74 THE ANTI. IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

our advantage, and to the present and future political, 
moral, physical, religious and commercial benefit of those 
people. We will have no adopted children that we will 
feel ashamed of. 

And none that will not love us. 

5. Another proposition is equally clear, i. e., that the 
inhabitants of the conquered or ceded territory have no 
rights — strict, technical rights— under the principles of 
international law, to intervene or to be heard in the 
discussion of a treaty of cession which involved the transfer 
of the territory they occuj^y. 
Mr. Schurz complains that when 

" we began negotiations for peace with the ' common enemy', 
and our Filipino allies asked to be heard in these negotiations 
as to the future of their country, we slammed the door in their 
faces as if they had no right to their country at all." (New 
York Herald, July 14, 1900.) 

I deny the fact that they asked to be heard. Aguinaldo 
begged us not to yield the territory to Spain or to sell it in 
the open market " preferably to England." He never 
asked to be heard, but he did have his emissary, Agoncillo, 
at Washington, who fully and extravagantly presented his 
views in writing to each Senator before the ratification of 
the treaty — with no effect. 

But irrespective of the question of fact — what is the rule 
in such cases? 

Were the inhabitants of that vast territory ceded to us 
by the Louisiana purchase heard? Were the people who 
resided in Alaska, before its cession to us, heard? 

Were the Alsatians heard before they were put under 
German domination? 

There is such a thing as being so tender and delicate 
about the rights of people as to become impracticable, 
visionary and platouic. We are not living in the millennium 
yet. Human rights are protected by human laws, and 



THE ANTl-IMrKRlA/.lsrs ANS\V1:KI-J). 75 

when our laws are based upon the greatest good for the 
greatest number, we approach as near to perfection as 
mortals have been able to attain. 

These Anti-Imperialists are so refined in some parts of 
their reasoning that they argue themselves out of all 
schemes of political salvation. 

6. If the above propositions did not necessarily, logi- 
cally and naturally How from conquest or cession of terri- 
tory neither could ever be made. It would be abortive. 

The Alsatians might have objected to becoming German- 
ized ; the Alaskans to becoming Americanized ; and so 
on through the whole category of historical examples. It 
shows that such an argument leads to a reductio ad ab- 
surdum. 

X. 

Out of the foregoing facts and history a coterie of sen- 
timentalists and politicians have endeavored to create and 
to force a false and untimely political issue, which they 
have baptized " Imperialism," and the Democratic party, 
destitute of real questions, has eagerly seized hold of this 
barren name to hoist itself into power. 

The name is a misnomer. It has no application to any 
existing conditions — the issite is false because there are 
no facts to support it — and the result will necessarily be 
Jiollow. 

If the Democrats should succeed they would do nothing 
for the Filipinos which the Republicans will not do. The 
rebellion must cease; Aguinaldo must be eliminated, and 
then a series of reforms can be inaugurated, leading up 
gradually but surely to a free government by the people. 
Let any man look the facts — all of them — squarely in the 
face, and tell me why he should vote the Democratic 
ticket? Why should we turn out of office an Administra- 



76 THE ANTI-IMPEKIAIJSTS ANSWERED. 

tion closelj^ familiar witli the existing situati(3n, whose 
usefulness as public servants will be much greater than 
ever, and to place in its stead a party whose stock-in- 
trade consists in promises which they cannot fulfil and 
representations which they know to be false? 

Imperialism ! Without an Imperator — without an Em- 
pire ! There never was anything so far-fetched in political 
history. It is impossible that the people can be deceived 
by such wretched, superficial and tiimsy fraud. 

The same title would apply to the Louisiana, the Texas, 
the New Mexico, the Alaska transactions — these will all 
fall under the modern definition of " Imperialism." 

The accession of territory has been gradually going on 
from the foundation of our government. As the popula- 
tion increases, and our commerce develops, we push out 
as naturally as men grow — from babyhood to adolescence, 
from adolescence to manhood. In the iDrogress of a 
national life which Almighty God has confided to our 
hands, no man can say what will be the full measure of 
our political development and commercial growth; or 
where it will lead us. Every time the question occurs of 
new territorial acquisition Schurzs and Bryans arise and 
cry out against it, and prophesy and threaten dire 
calamity to the nation. 

What became of the past prophecies made at the time 
of our former territorial accessions? Ground to atoms 
under the overpowering weight of historical truth ; of our 
present prosperitj' and civilization ; every act vindicated 
and applauded. 

And now comes a new set of false apostles crying out 
against the Philippine victory — made memorable by the 
generous manner in which we treated Spain in giving her 
twenty million dollars to confirm a title which we already 
possessed by conquest. 

They borrow from the images of ancient history a name, 
and they undertake to apply it to existing facts by assert- 



nil-: AXT/./A//'/:A'/.\f./sTs AX sir/-: A' /'in. 77 

ing- that the limits of this Republic, are iiatinally and VAm 
stitutionally confined to this continent. They ar^Mie that 
we should erect a Chinese wall around our present terri- 
torial possessions and shut ourselves out from the world I 
And this is their full conception of our future and of the 
purposes of a civilised government. 

They argue that because the Philippines are ^'■far 
aioay^'' that that fact constitutes Imperialism. I will 
spend no time in answering such a proposition. Manila 
Bay is not as "far away" as Oregon was when it was 
annexed. Science has annihilated both space and time, 
and territory or commerce which might not have inter- 
ested us fifty years ago may now become a crying neces- 
sity. 

But Mr. Schurz, better informed in history than most 
of his fellow Anti Imperialists, appreciates that his argu- 
ments, to have any force, must embrace the worst features 
of a despotic government — that a mere question of dis- 
tance between San Francisco and Manila will not answer 
for " Imperialism," and he throws into the discussion the 
elements of "conquest," " criminal aggression," "bare- 
faced usurpation of power;" "the wanton and unneces- 
sary sacrifice of life;" "wrenching from a nation their 
country and brutally shooting the inhabitants down ; and 
governing them without their consent and against the 
spirit of our own declaration of independence." 

He does not dare to give us a definition of Imperialism ; 
general denunciation is the limit of his argument; but 
lumping his accusations together, extracting from them 
all of their salient points, the impeachment he makes of 
this Republic under the name of Imperialism is this: the 
creation and waging of an unnecessary and cruel war in 
a pure spirit of aggression, conquest and greed and for the 
purpose of politically enslaving the inhabitants against 
their will and governing them by laws different from those 
under which thd conqueror's own people live and against 



^ 



78 THE AXTI IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

tlie true spirit of modern liberty aad civilisation. This is 
Mr. Scliurz's " Imperialism." 

One can only appreciate the full strength of it when 
these charges are compressed into a definition or indict- 
ment. This he skilfully avoids. 

This accusation, as 1 have shown, is false — false as a 
general statement, false in every detail, false in fact, false 
in reason, false in law. Recall the salient events in this 
connection. The war which was declared against Spain on 
the 25th of April, 1898, was the result of almost complete 
unanimity on the part of Congress. All will remember with 
what positive reluctance Mr. McKinley entered into the 
spirit of this declaration — how he postponed, delayed and 
hesitated, and how he was pushed by the overwhelming 
sentiment of both branches of the national legislature, by 
Republicans and Democrats alike, into commencing hos- 
tilities against Spain. 

,| A few days after the war was declared Manila fell. 

;iThe Philippines practically became ours from that date. 

JjThey fell into our hands as naturally as a ripe apple drops 
from a tree into the lap of earth; they came into our pos- 
session unexpectedly, without aggression or thought of 

. conquest. 

The proclamation of Mr. McKinley, dated May 19, 
1898, was a broad and clear assumption of sovereignty on 
our part, justified by the facts, by the Constitution of the 
United States and by the laws of war and of nations. 
Not only tliat but its purpose and spirit were just, liberal 
and humane. 

Upon this branch of the subject, then, it must be plain to 
everyone who desires to take his stand on the truth and the 
truth only, that Mr. McKinley and his Cabinet are justly 
beyond the reach of censure. Their personal honor, so grossly 
assailed, stands unimpeached, and the charges involving it 
recoil upon their assailants. Heavy responsibilities were 
devolved ui)on them in this matter, but they have been man- 



THr. AKTIJiMI'l-RlALJSTS A XSW El< ED. 79 

fully met, and in the only way that would liavt* satisliH<l 
the people of this country — the sentinnMitalist and 
factious opposition excepted. The justice of the war 
with Spain being granted, oui- authority over the 
Philippines came to us legitimately, both by cession an<l 
under the law of nations. 

That Mr. Bryan believed in the war is a matter of his- 
tory. I cite Colonel William J. Bryan, the commander 
of a Mississippi regiment, as my authority. That he 
believes the United States is the lawful sovereign of the 
Philippine Islands I cite his letter of acceptance (ante, 
I). 58), which candidly admits that he was in favor of 
and vv^orked for the ratification of the treaty between 
Spain and the United States by which these islands were 
ceded to us. 

The side show opened by Aguinaldo,aud which drew all 
of its vitality and nourishment from the American nation, 
vv^as a premature attempt to anticipate natural conditions — 
to ripen fruit before it had matured — to build a govern- 
ment without the consent of the real sovereign or the 
people to be governed. 

He was positively and frequently notified of our views, 
and expressly informed that he would not be recognized 
either in a civil or military capacity. If he went on with 
the organization of a dictatorial constitution, after all of 
these warnings, it cannot add to the strength of his 
original unfounded title. But these facts show the true 
character of Aguinaldo, and prove that he was working 
solely in his own interest and that of his immediate 
cabal — and not of the people. Give praises to the Presi- 
dent and his Cabinet for their wisdom in protecting the 
people against Aguinaldo, and do not censure them for 
their great and noble work. 

The insurrection which we found in the Philippines, 
whether slumbering or active, could not be countenanced 
or permitted without an utter abandonment of self-respect 



80 THE ANTI-IMPERIAUSTS ANSWERED. 

and of duty. When was it ever before contended that 
the mere naked existence of an insurrection destroyed at 
once and ^;>er se the ri^ht of sovereignty ? 

The situation was anomalous in some of its aspects, and 
made necessary the delicate consideration which was given 
to it, affecting as it did not merely our own rights and in- 
terests, but the welfare of the Islanders and the interests of 
foreign communities ; but for that very reasons an abandon- 
ment of the status was impossible. Such an abandon- 
ment would under the circumstances have been a kind of 
national /eZo de se; more than " infamy '" (to borrow Mr. 
Schurz's favorite word) — it would have been degeneracy. 

If " Imperialism '' means a sympathy for and a full and 
hearty endorsement of the acts and events which led up 
to the acquisition and retention of the Philippine 
Islands; if it means an approval of the acts of the Admin- 
istration in opposing the hostilities commenced by 
Aguinaldo against our government, I am an " Imperialist, " 
outspoken and uncompromising. I am not one of those 
Republicans whom Mr. Schurz says "are troubled in their 
consciences about what has been done " ; nor do I believe 
there are any such who have looked fully and fairly into 
the question ; nor do I think Mr. Schurz is a proper 
authority to diagnose the " consciences " of Republicans. 
His wish is i)erhaps largely represented in his expression. 

XI. 

stamiing Auioug Other bogies to enforce their party shibboleth 

the old attempted argument of the evils of a "standing 
army " is revamped, and Mr. Bryan in his letter of accept- 
ance says : 

" If we liavc an imperial policy we must have a large stand- 
ing army as its natural and necessary complement. * * * * 
A large standing army is not only a pecuniar}^ burden to the 
people, and if accompanied by comi^ulsory service a constant 



ArmifS. 



THE AiXTl-lMrilRrAI ISTS A A-SW/.A'/: /). 81 

source of irflttitiuii, Imt il is I've-r a nicuiicc tu a Jtijiuhliian 
form of f/overnfiient. Tin lo-nti/ In the personificaliun of force, 
and militarism will inevitably change the ideals of the people 
and turn the thoughts of our young men from the arts of 
peace to the science of war." 

And the Democratic platform is even more profuse in its 
condemnation of this supposed evil. In the first place no 
one has inaugurated an "imperial policy." The Philip- 
pine question was not the result of any formed or settled 
policy ; it was the result of an accident of war, fortunate 
in that it gave us greater and further commercial advan- 
tages in ou]' dealings and trade I'elatious with the Far East. 

In the next place, I deny that a " standing army " is a 
menace to a republican form of government, and I am 
astonished that Mr. Bryan should be so careless of history 
and so indifferent to the provisions of the Constitution of 
the United States as to lay down such a proposition. It 
is pure and open demagogism, because it is directly oppo- 
site to the facts. 

A "standing army " in a free government, in the sense 
in which that term is used here and in England, has never 
been a menace to its institutions. 

Let us recur to history to verify this statement. Pre- 
vious to the reign of William the Third the subject of a 
"standing army" always excited bitter and acrimonious 
contest between Parliaments and Kings. The fear of the 
people grew out of placing the control of such a weapon 
in the hands of the Executive power alone. But when 
the revolution of 1688 was finished, it was found that there 
was no prohibition against a " a standing army '' in the 
Bill of Rights but that the whole question was left in the 
hands of Parliament. 

And one of the first acts of the Whig Parliament — the 
King and Parliament being now in unity after a consti- 
tutional monarchy had been firmly established — was the 
creation of a standing army. Strange comment upon Mr. 



82 THE ANTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

Bryan's criticism and of the platform of the Democratic 
part}', that a standing army was born and nurtnred in that 
great cradle of liberty, the revolution of 1688 ! 

Before that plank of the Democratic platform was written 
and before Mr. Bryan had delivered his acceptance, both 
history and the Constitution should have been studied. But 
the Anti-Imperialists do not want the truth — they want 
words — high-sounding terms — like "Imperialism" — the 
" Principles of the Declaration of Independence " — " Mili- 
tarism " — they wish to trap the " German " vote ; they re- 
gard the voters as idiots and fools who will accept what they 
say without thought or examination ; and thus upon the 
wings of demagogism they hope to fly into power. And 
now the " Standing Army " is their "drawing card." 

I invoke a sentence or two from Macaulay (History of 
England, Vol. V., p. 256 et seq.) which absolutely grinds 
this last assumption into a million atoms : 

" We have made the discovery that an army may be so 
constituted as to be in the highest degree efficient against an 
enemy, and yet obsequious to the civil magistrate. We have 
long ceased to apprehend danger to law and to freedom from 
the license of troops and from the ambition of victorious gen- 
erals. An alarmist who should now talk such language as was 
common five generations ago, who should call for the entire 
disbanding of the land-force of the realm, and who should 
gravely predict that the warriors of Inkerraan and Delhi would 
depose the Queen, dissolve the Parliament, and plunder the 
Bank, would be regarded as fit only for a cell in Saint Luke's. 
But before the Revolution our ancestors had known a standini^ 
army only as an instrument of lawless power. Judging by their 
own experience they thought it impossible that such an army 
should exist without danger to the rights both of the crown and 
of the people. One class of politicians Avas never weary of 
repeating that an Apostolic Church, a loyal gentry, an ancient 
nobility, a sainted king, had been foully outraged by the Joyces 
and the Prides ; another class recounted the atrocities com- 
mitted by the Lambs of Kirke, and by the Beelz«bubs and Luci- 



THK AXTl-IMPI-.RIAI ISIS A X SWI.K i-.l). H3 

fers of Dundee; and both classes, agreeiiij^ in scarcely anything 
else, were disposed to agree in aversicjn to the redcoats." 

" The debate, which recurred every spring on the Mutiny 
Bill, came to be regarded merely as an occasion on which hope- 
ful young orators fresh from Christchurch were to deliver 
maiden speeches setting forth how the guards of Pisistratus 
seized the citadel of Athens, and how the Prjctorian cohorts 
sold the Roman Empire to Didius. At length these declama- 
tions became too ridiculous to be repeated. The most old- 
fashioned, the most eccentric politician, could hardly, in the 
reign of George the Third, contend that there ought to be no 
regular soldiers, or that the ordinary law, administered by the 
ordinary courts, would effectually maintain discipline among 
such soldiers. All parties being agreed as to the general prin- 
ciple, a long succession of Mutiny Bills passed without any 
discnssion, except when some particular article of the military 
code appeared to require amendment. It is, perhaps, because 
the array became thus gradually and almost imperceptibly one 
of the institutions of England that it has acted in such perfect 
harmony with all her other institutions, has never once during 
a hundred and sixty years, been untrue to the throne or dis- 
obedient to the law, has never once defied the tribunals or 
overawed the constitutent bodies." (Macaulay's History of 
England, Chap. XL, p. 189) (1689). 

Then when we turn to the history of our country we find 
that the framers of our Constitution had no fear of a 
"Standing Army," nor had the people who ratified their 
work. The subject was vividly present to tlieir minds, 
but they unhesitatinoly committed the whole subject to the 
discretion of Congress, which 
" shall have power * * * 

12. To raise and support armies * * * 

13. To provide and maintain a navy. 

14. To make rules for the governnunt and regulation of the 
land and naval forces. 

15. To provide for calling forth the militia to ext-cute the 
laws of tlie Union, supjtri'ss in-surri'dioiis and ropcl invasions. 



84 THE ANTI-IMPEKJAUSTS ANSWERED. 

10. To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the 
militia * * * " g^g 

The wisdom of the people iu placing this extensive 
p)ower in the hands of Congress has been amply justified 
by history, and the assertion that a " standing army " has 
been or is anywise detrimental to the Republican institu- 
tions, or demoralizing to the people of the country, is 
utterly unsupported by the facts. The truth is far the 
other way. Of all of the parts of our government a 
" standing army " has been one of the most successful and 
commendable. 

Tlie distinction between civil and military power has 
been well defined by our Courts whenever the subject has 
come before them ; and it has been as well preserved here 
as Mr. Macaulay states it has in England. 

The line between civil and military authority is main- 
tained with the greatest nicety, respect and fidelity by 
American officers and by our soldiers and sailors. We have 
had no trouble at all with a "Standing Army," neither in 
whole nor in part. That it is a necessary and essential 
feature of our Government every one must admit; that its 
history and record are matters of felicitation and pride no 
intelligent man can deny. Why, then, go back to a period 
previous to the reign of William the Third to find argu- 
ments against a "Standing Army," and undertake to 
apply them to existing and essentially different conditions ; 
to drag out of the past old and effete doctrines which can 
have no applicability to present circumstances? As well 
may we endeavor to cultivate oranges and figs at the North 
Pole as to attempt to plant the reasons which the people 
then had against a " Standing Army " in the soil of our 
present civilization. Everything is different — everything 
is changed. "Circumstances alter cases" is a trite but 
exact maxim. If our institutions and our training are not 
adequate to sustain all dangers coming from a " Standing 
Army " we had better abandon them. We are not plants 



TlIK AN ri-IMI'r.RIAI.Il.TS AXSWEKEP. ^5 

to thrive by living in a house of ghiss. A " Stantliiig 
Army" is more of a necessity to day than ever before for 
reasons which will occur to all, among others tliat it 
furnishes the nucleus for a greater army if one beccjiiies 
necessary. In proportion to our population an army of 
100,000 would be absolutely innocuous. 

We have tried the experiment of armies in this country 
and they have never given any honest student or lover of 
our institutions the slightest cause for anxiety or regret. 
Their record is glorious in war and in peace. If ever the 
country was tested in this respect it was at the time of the 
Civil War, when in the North and South it is estimated 
that four millions of soldiers bore arms. The Union Army 
alone at the close of the war contained 1,034,064 soldiers. 
And yet this vast soldiery, as soon as the war linished, 
" melted down into the body of the people and ceased to 
show a trace of their existence," as Macaulay says in 
speaking of the wars of the Commonwealth. What nobler 
record can be shown than this? Do not such instances 
disclose the true nature of our soldiery and shed light 
on the character of our people and our institutions? The 
attempt on the part of Mr. Bryan to attack the character 
of the soldiers and sailors of this country and their loyalty 
to our institutions will recoil upon him and his party. 

It was an unfortunate moment when he invaded the 
armories of past history — long gone by — and undertook 
to use the old and rusty weapons which he found tliere to 
uphold the flimsy and shallow arguments of his party. 
As the matter is forcibly put by the Chicago Times-Herald : 
"To-day the man who talks of militarism as an impending 
danger to the republic as a ' menace to our liberties,' as threat- 
ening us with 'a vast military service and conscrii>tion,' is a 
demagogue or a fool, whose knowledge of and faith in the 
American people could be mobilized on the point of a cambric 
needle." 

And thus vanishes " Imperialism " and its alleged ad- 



86 THE AXTI-IMPERIALISTS ANSWERED. 

junct a "Standing Army" before the stern countenance 
of truth, facts and history. 

The only hope of the Anti-Imperialists is that their ad- 
herents will do as they have done — not read or study the 
cold, unerring facts. If they do, the false and shallow doc- 
trines which have been promulgated will disappear like 
snow before a summer's sun. 

The question of "Imperialism," as it relates to these 
Philippine Islands, has not yet definitely arisen. What the 
future may bring forth it is too early to forecast. Whether, 
if the Filipinos should ever become fit for self-govern- 
ment or any well-chosen form of government adapted to 
their own needs and aspirations, and should then, with 
something api)roaching to unanimity, demand a separation 
from us (thus placing themselves in a situation resembling 
our own at the time of the Declaration of Independence), 
that demand should be recognized and under what condi- 
tions—then the question so eagerly urged by the Anti- 
Imperialists will, in fact, have arisen. 

The Filipinos have never yet governed themselves — nor 
have they ever made an attempt for independence against 
the Spanish domination — as I have shown. To ask them 
to go through a probative period is not making a great 
demand either upon their patience or philosophy. In the 
meantime I see no occasion to fear "Imperialism" con- 
sidered as an abstract proposition. I am quite prepared to 
define what it really is, to discuss it in the light of history 
and experience when the occasion arises. The American 
people, when they are really awakened to the importance 
of it, are ready to discuss and deal with any question which 
affects their vital, political or moral principles or future 
prosperity and happiness. It is a miserably narrow and 
mistaken view to ascribe to a government merely selfish 
ends. A government has an object, as a man has a pur- 
pose in his creation. If, in the interest of our own devel- 
opment, and of Christianity and civilization, we are led 



THE AMTf-IMPERfAfJSTS A X SWEREP. 87 

into new territorial lields, I hope I urn not paj'inf? the 
American people and their institutions an unmerited eulo;^y 
when I say that they have the character, intelligence and 
courao-e to meet every situation which may occur in their 
national life. 



"Ill public speeches," says Mr. Schurz, "I have again and 
again challenged the Imperialists to show me in the history of 
the world a single act of ^>e?;/?<7y committed by any rejmhUc 
more infamous than that which has been committed by Presi- 
dent McKinley's administration against our Filipino allies." — 
New York Herald, July 14, 1900. 

What is ' ' perfidy ? ' ' We are told by the lexicographers, 
legal and others, that it is " the act of one who has en- 
gaged his faith to do a thing and does not do it, but does 
the contrary.'' Did this Republic engage its faith to 
Aguinaldo? I have shown that it never did, directly or 
indirectly, by express or implied engagement ; by infer- 
ence or assumption. Let Mr. ^chwvz prove the " perfidy " 
and I will then compare the conduct of this Republic with 
that of other Republics, ancient and modern. 

But I will answer a challenge based upon no evidence 
by another founded upon fact : 

Show me if you can in the history of any goDernment 
— I will not confine you to Republics — a more undignified, 
unmerited, malicious and unfounded attack upon any Ad- 
ministration than that made by you and your associate 
Anti-Imperialists upon Mr. McKinley and his Cabinet. 

New York, August, 1900. 



pSsiFl^ffiiSi 



] H Willi"! l/ll/ll/'/i' I 



013 744 630 3 



